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T HERE exists in the law of Sales a line of confused cases that may
roughly be classified as dealing with "waiver" of unstated objections
to the defective performance of a Sales contract. These cases were fos-
tered by the unnecessarily extended interpretation given by the case of
Littlejohn v. Shaw to its actual ruling.' In that case, a contract executed
March, 1893, for 25 tons of No. 1 cube gambier to be shipped at Singa-
pore for New York contained a provision that the goods were to be of
usual good merchantable quality and condition. On the arrival of the
goods in New York, the sellers sent a delivery order to the buyers, who
returned it, assigning as reasons for their rejection that the goods were
not in good merchantable condition and not of good quality. When
sued by the sellers for the price and expenses of storage less proceeds
on resale, the buyers contended that the sellers had to prove that they
had carried out the terms of the contract regarding manner and time of
shipment as well as those regarding the condition and quality of the
goods, and that since the sellers had not done so, their action should
be dismissed. But this argument did not prevail. In affirming a judg-
ment below for the sellers the New York Court of Appeals declared:
"In this case, the defendants placed their rejection of the gambier upon
two specific grounds, viz: that it was not of good merchantable quality,
and that it was not in good merchantable condition. By thus formally
stating their objections, they must be held to have waived all other ob-
jections. The principle is plain and needs no argument in support of it
that, if a particular objection is taken to the performance and the party
is silent as to all others, they are deemed to be waived," especially where
the deliberateness of the objection shows there has been a consideration
of the matter of acceptance and the result reached on particular grounds.
Furthermore, the buyers' exception to the denial of their motion to dis-
miss was waived by them, said the court, thus indicating that the broad
rule which it had just set forth was not necessary to a decision of the
case.
2
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Removal of the buyer's legitimate defenses in this fashion would
appear to be justifiable only when there is present some peculiar ele-
ment in the factual situation, such as the possibility of obviating the
complained of defect in performance had timely notice thereof been
given, or when there exists cause for the belief that the buyer is en-
deavoring to squirm out of a contract which he finds suddenly oppres-
sive because of an adverse price movement. Nevertheless, the broad,
formal rule enunciated in Littlejohn v. Shaw has been, and often still is,
applied blindly to cases in which neither of these justifying elements is
to be found. The explanation of this is no doubt to be found in the
belief of most courts that respect for precedent compels such a result.
But if it can be shown that the vast majority of the cases out of which
this precedent has been solidified contained factual elements which
logically and equitably distinguished them from the cases to which the
broad rule is to-day sought to be applied, their force as precedent is
substantially destroyed. 'It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate
that this is indeed the fact with respect to the rule against the setting
up of unstated objections. The most important distinguishing factor to
be taken into account is that pointed out by Llewellyn, namely, a fall-
ing market between the closing of the deal and the tendered delivery.
As a matter of logic and equity, the presence of this factor alone should
be sufficient to account for judicial refusal to allow the buyer to set up
at trial new objections to the seller's performance.' Accordingly, the
cases in which it is found should not at all be regarded as authority for
the rigid rule which would bar unstated objections in all circumstances.
II
THE STATE OF THE LAW TO-DAY
The facts in cases dealing with the subject of unstated objections may
vary along many significant lines. The buyer may have been aware of
the unstated objections at the time he rejected, or he may not have been;
and if he was not, perhaps he should have been. His seller, too, may
have been aware of all the objections that the buyer later seeks to set
up, or he may not have been. The seller, in fact, may have asked for
more definite information, looking to cure. Then there are the cases
where the defect could have been remedied had it been made known to
the seller at the time of rejection, and there are the cases where it could
not have been so remedied, either because time for performance had
elapsed, or for some other reason. The buyer who has rejected may
seek to set up his later objections only after litigation has commenced,
or he may have made them known to the seller at some time after the
3. LLVwEELy, op. dt. supra note 1, at 302.
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original rejection, but before the legal machinery has begun to operate.
The stated objections may have been given by means of a carefully
planned formal list, or they may have been hastily communicated with
the intention of impressing the seller with the fact of rejection rather
than the reasons for it. The buyer may have given no reason for rejec-
tion at the time of protestation, or may have stated it generally and later
sought to set up his specific defenses at the trial. The seller may have
been led, in reliance on the stated objections, to act or refrain from acting
in some way, or the buyer may have gained some advantage by keeping
silent about the defect in performance that he later seeks to set up.
Finally, there are the cases that combine various of these different ele-
ments. Since any of these numerous fact variations may influence the
court, it is important, in order to reach a helpful comparison of results,
to analyse each of the fact situations carefully.
In those cases where the buyer does not know of his unstated objections
at the time of rejection, the courts generally allow him to set them up
for the first time as defenses to a suit by the seller, 4 except perhaps
where his stated grounds give reason to believe that the actual defects
were not, so far as concerns normal conditions, really material to him."
By far the majority of the cases, however, deal with the situation where
the buyer is held to have known of the unstated defects at the time he
rejected performance; and here, generally, the courts, for one reason or
4. Banco Nacional Ultramarino v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 289 Fed. 169 (D. Mass.
1923) (refusal to accept and pay under a letter of credit) ; Ungerer & Co. v. Louis Maull
Cheese & Fish Co., 155 Mo. App. 95, 134 S. W. 56 (1911) (no knowledge of unstated
defect till trial and hence Littlejohn v. Shaw not applicable; note that the unstated objection
was a reasonable approximation of the stated one); Fowler v., Cobb, 232 S. W. 1084 (Mo.
App. 1921) (query whether the buyer should not have known of the unstated defect);
Newbery v. Furnival, 56 N. Y. 638 (1874); Granger Co. v. Universal Machinery Corp.,
193 App. Div. 234, 183 N. Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't, 1920); Prescott & Co. v. J. B. Powles
& Co., 113 Wash. 177, 193 Pac. 680 (1920) (facts show no knowledge of the unstated
defect at time of protestation and attitude is decidedly against Littlejohn v. Shaw); see
Tuggle v. Green & Sons, 150 Ga. 361, 370, 104 S. E. 85, 89 (1920); Brown & Bigelow v,
Bard, 64 Misc. 249, 252, 118 N. Y. Supp. 371, 374, (County Ct., 1909); Fielding v. Rob-
ertson, 141 Va. 123, 132, 126 S. E. 231, 234 (1925); cf. H. D. Williams Cooperage Co.
v. Scofield, 115 Fed. 119 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) (exempting the S from the waiver rule),
5. In Armsby Co. v. Raymond Bros.-Clarke Co., 90 Neb. 553, 134 N. W. 174 (1912),
there was cancellation before arrival because of poor busines conditions and inability
to pay. Held, that B cannot object now on the ground of S's failure to deliver to tie
carrier per contract. Note that the first refusal was for a reason extrinsic to the contract,
which would lead the court to believe that B had no real complaint to make with S's
performance, and that this extrinsic reasoul was a poor market, which would heighten that
belief. See Knox v. Schoenthal, 59 Hun 620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7, 8 (Sup. Ct. 1891), In
which the fact that the defect could have been remedied outweighed the fact that it was
not actually known. Because B had rejected before S's performance had reached the stage




another, forbid his setting up those objections at the trial.' In some
of these cases the defects could have been obviated within the contract
time had they been made known to the seller.' Where this is so, the
court tends to stress this factor as the one influencing its decision 8 But
6. Ginn v. Clark Coal Co., 143 Mich. 84, 106 N. W. 867 (1906) (refusal to complete con-
tract on the ground that the coal sent was not P. G. coal as called for by the contract-
Testimony offered to prove the coal rejected was not merchantable. Held, properly ex-
cluded. S had a right to rely on the assumption that the rejection because it was not
P. G. coal was the only ground on which B relied, and it would be unjuft to allow him
to rely on other grounds at the trial). Motion for rehearing denied. 143 Mich. 83, 107 N.
W. 904 (1906) (Should not "P. G. coal" mean "merchantable P. G. coal"?); Poison Log-
ging Co. v. Neumeyer, 229 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916); Bank of Taiwan v. Union Nat.
Bank of Philadelphia, 1 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924); Erie Food Products Co. v.
Inter-ocean Mercantile Corp., 299 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Hill v. Fruita Mercantile
Co., 42 Colo. 491, 94 Pac. 354 (1908); Harvard Co. v. Himmelein, 226 Mich. 691, 193
N. W. 207 (1924) (B asked to be relieved from contract because customers refused de-
livery); Gould v. Banks & Gould, 8 Wend. 562 (N. Y. 1832); Hess v. Kaufherr, 129
App. Div. 526, 112 N. Y. Supp. 832 (1st Dep't, 1908) (stressing deliberatenEs of the
objections); De Hoff v. Aspegren, 96 MIsc. 681, 161 N. Y. Supp. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (H
walked out of an arbitration on the stated ground. B precluded from setting up a
Statute of Frauds point, though the court intimated that had he rejected generally or
kept silent, B would have been protected); Lowinson v. Newman, 201 App. Div. 266, 194
N. Y. Supp. 253 (1st Dep't, 1922); see Keswick v. Rafter, 35 App. Div. 503, 513, 54
N. Y. Supp. 850, 854, (1st Dep't, 1898).
7. There are many interesting questions connected with the topic of obviation of defects
which it is not proposed to discuss here in detail, although it is important to note them.
There is the primary, and most uncertain problem, of whether the seller has the right
to retender after his first tender has been rejected, even though all defects have been
made known to him. And if he is allowed to so tender, there is the question of the number
of times he may be permitted to tender before the buyer changes his position in some
way. The very rejection by the buyer might posibly be considered such a change of
position as to preclude another tender. There is also the difficult question of just how
easy it is to correct the defect. Could it have been so easily remedied that there is
no doubt but that it could have been corrected within the time set for performance, or
was it just difficult enough so that possibly, though all defects had been pointed out
promptly, the correction would have occurred at a time beyond the contract time for
performance? And then there is the question of whether the court should require the
seller to show that the defect actually could have been remedied, or a-sume, from a mere
examination of the type of defect, that it could in fact have been obviated. So far as
there has actually been a prevention of the correction of a defect by the buyer's failure
to set out all objections, there is reason in the rule penalizing such failure.
8. Griffin Grocery Co. v. Richardson, 10 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Smith v.
Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13 (1877); Knox. v. Schoenthal, 59 Hun 620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. CL
1891); see Miller v. Ungerer, 188 App. Div. 655, 658, 176 N. Y. Supp. 350, 852 (2d
Dep't, 1919); Smith Co. v. Moscahlades, 193 App. Div. 126, 134, 183 N. Y. Supp. Sca,
507 (1st Dep't, 1920); Strasbourger v. Leerburger, 233 N. Y. 55, 60, 134 N. E. 834, 836
(1922) (advocating the confinement of the Littlejohn v. Shaw doctrine to the "obviation"
cases); Hyman v. Hullman, 205 App. Div. 119, 122, 199 N. Y. Supp. 366, 367 (1st Dep't,
1923); Jardella v. Welin Davit & Boat Corp., 219 App. Div. 353, 360, 220 N. Y. Supp.
115, 121 (2d Dep't, 1927); cf. Mente v. De Witt Rice Mill Co., 231 Fed. 252 (C. C. A.
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there is very little investigation to see whether the defect in fact could
have been remedied; there being, rather, a "presumption" by the court
of the possibility of obviation from a mere examination of the type
of defect.9 The "presumption" is indulged often to give reason to an
otherwise unjustifiable decision, though cases in such jurisdictions have
been similarly decided even without the presence of the factor of obvia-
tion.10 Some of the cases mention the fact that litigation had already
begun before the buyer voiced his objections.11 This is apparently con-
Sth, 1918) (refusal to perform because the contract in question depended on another that
was never made; held, B can defend on the ground the minds never met, since the defect
could not have been obviated). And see Western Grocer Co. v. New York Oversea Co.,
28 F. (2d) 518, 520 (N. D. Cal., 1928) (B objected to defects in documents promptly
on receipt, and since they could not be obviated, the rule that one refusing performance
on one ground cannot rely on another that could be remedied did not apply, especially
where the defects were concealed during early stages of controversy).
9. E.g. in Knox v. Schoenthal, 59 Hun 620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1891), in which
hops were rejected because "slack dried and damp", there was a question whether the
defect in weight later relied on could in fact have been obviated. Note that, since the
contract was for all of S's hops, all those which he had were presumably delivered; and
he was not privileged to make up the deficiency from other sources. Though the defect
might have been corrected by rebaling (since the total weight was over the contract
minimum) there is a question whether it could have been so corrected within the contract
time. Secondly, and more important, note that the court nowhere considered these
factual elements. Also see Griffin Grocery Co. v. Richardson, 10 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926), where time must have been deemed to have been of the essence because of
the fluctuating market. Query: Smith v. Moscahlades, 193 App. Div. 126, 134, 183 N. Y.
Supp. 500, 507, (1st Dep't, 1920), especially if time were in question.
10. Compare the New York cases in note 6, supra, with those in note 8, supra.
11. United Fruit Co. v. Bisse, 25 Pa. Super. 170 (1904) (holding that S had a right to
know all the grounds of refusal in deciding what action to take, and that such choice
had been denied him by the failure of B to object to quantity); cf. Rochevot v. Wolf,
96 App. Div. 506, 89 N. Y. Supp. 142 (4th Dep't, 1904) (suit by B; in deciding whether
to litigate or not S had a right to rely on the defects specified as the only ones he would
have to contend with. Hiscock, J., stressed the deliberateness of the notice sent.)
Polson Logging Co. v. Neumeyer, 229 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916); Godchaux Sugars
Inc. v. Meridian Wholesale Co., 289 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Frank & Meyer Neck-
wear Co. v. White, 29 Ga. App. 694, 116 S. E. 855 (1923) (objection that too many ties
were sent maintained even at the trial; granting of subsequent motion by B for nonsuit
on ground that too few were sent, reversed); Cobb Lumber Co. v. Sunny South Grain
Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E. 759 (1926); see Cadick Milling Co., v. Valdosta Grocery
Co., 72 Ind. App. 534, 546, 126 N. E. 240, 244 (1920). But cf. St. John Bros. Co. v. Falkson,
237 Mass. 399, 130 N. E. 51 (1921) (failure to mention wrong delivery prior to litigation
not decisive of the waiver of the right to set up such reason as a defense, but was a
question for the jury). Note that the goods were never received by B. It is reasonable
to suppose that other reasons were given before litigation in this case, but query. Inman,
Akers & Inman v. Elk Cotton Mills, 116 Tenn. 141, 92 S. W. 760 (1906) (cancellation
which S refused to accept. Held, S refused the repudiation and therefore kept the contract
alive so B could avail himself of all breaches of S, and pleading could be amended to
include an unstated objection) Note that the original reason fairly covers the new facts
and that there was no knowledge by B at time of rejection.
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ceived to be a change of position by the seller induced by the stated
objections sufficient to bar the buyer's reliance on other defenses. But
there is no investigation to see whether the suit was hurriedly instituted
by the seller, perhaps to cut off unstated objections of which the seller
then had knowledge. Moreover, the rigid rule of "waiver" apparently
operates also in those cases in which the buyer has raised the new objec-
tion before litigation has begun, but after a first notice had been sent;
for there too courts have held that the second objection came too late
and must be deemed to have been "waived" because of failure to include
it in the first notice.'2 Perhaps the principal doctrinal importance of
the cases that stress the two facts of possible "obviation" and the com-
mencement of litigation is their tendency to draw an estoppel out of these
facts. 3
Little stress is laid, in these cases, on the formality of the objection.
The courts largely argue as though a hurried telegram sent under pres-
sure was the equivalent of a letter sent on the seller's express request,
with litigation in prospect, and detailing the contract and the arrival of
the goods, and listing the reasons for rejection.' 4 Most of those cases
12. Linger v. Wilson, 73 W. Va. 669, 80 S. E. 1105 (1914) (second objection, sent one
week after first, precluded). Note the apparent stretching of the facts, the court saying
that B said in his first letter that he would accept if his objection was remedied. But
compare the stated facts; see Manda v. Etienne, 93 App. Div. 609, 611, 87 N. Y. Supp.
588, 593 (1st Dep't, 1904) (second objection mailed to S in France before, but not re-
ceived before suit by B was brought). Even though S had been given an opportunity to
remedy the defect before suit, query whether he could have retendered at all, and if s,
whether he could have done so within the contract time. Note that though notice of
objection apparently arrived before notice of suit, S did nothing to correct this defect.
Brown & Bigelow v. Bard, 64 IAlisc. 249, 252, 118 N. Y. Supp. 371, 374, (County Ct.,
1909) (defendant would have been limited to the objections in his first letter if be had
had complete knowledge of the facts); E. L. Rice & Co. v. Roberts, 172 S. E. 615, 616
(W. Va., 1934) (rejection because of poor business conditions. S refused to accept
rejection, and B replied referring to S's fraud and offering to take if S would stand risk
of payment; held, defense of fraud, even if relied on as a reason for rejection and not
merely stated in the second letter, would be insufficient because not given in the first.).
13. See, e.g., Godchaux Sugars, Inc, v. Mferidian Wholesale Co., 289 Fed. 359 (C. C. A.
5th, 1923); Rand v. Mforse, 289 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. Sth, 1923); Cobb Lumber Co. v.
Sunny South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E. 759 (1926) (the new ground cannot
be set up to render injurious to S the action [suit] taken by him on the ground of the
defect originally assigned). Note that the original rejection was becuse of unsati-fac-
tory quality and price, and that there was an offer to take at lower price. Knox v.
Schoenthal, 59 Hun 620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Rochevot v. Wolf, 96 App.
Div. 506, 89 N. Y. Supp. 142 (4th Dep't, 1904); United Fruit Co. v. Bisese, 25 Pa. Super.
170 (1904).
14. No case permitting the buyer to set up the unstated defects at the trial has been found
-which rests in any way on the possible fact that the notice of rejection was hastily sent
in order to acquaint the seller with the state of affairs so that he might best know how
to proceed. But in such a case there is much to be said against penalizing an honezt
buyer who hastily communicated his rejection, perhaps in order that the seller might not
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that do mention the deliberateness of the statement of objections do so
merely to add a make-weight argument, and do not pivot their arguments
about this point.15 But much stress should be laid upon this factor. For
even conceding that pressure brings out the real reasons for a business
man's rejection, it must be admitted that a hurried wire will omit many
things considered essential, in the belief that what has been stated is.
sufficient. 6 A detailed letter, evidencing thought and consideration,
may more nearly point to a reliance on only the facts stated.
In those cases where the buyer was not aware of the unstated defects,
but should have been, the courts generally treat him as if he had known
them." Only a few cases stress the point that there was no actual
lose any possible sales, and acting solely for the benefit of the seller. As was said in
Johannes Bros. Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 121 Misc. 474, 481, 201 N. Y. Supp. 409,
415 (Sup. Ct. 1923) "ordinarily a business man, discovering defects in goods supplied
by a reputable dealer, does not assume that he will be obliged to resort to legal pro-
ceedings to protect his rights, nor does he consult his lawyer as to the form of letter he
will write, but merely sends the dealer a complaint ..." The consultation with a lawyer
is usually resorted to only when there is a fear of legal action by the other party, or
a desire for legal action by the complainant. A business man's honesty may well be
gauged by his hesitancy to resort to legal action, and the actions and statements of a
business man should have their effect in this field judged from his point of view and not
from the lawyer's. See also as to the treatment of a business man's actions, United
Engine Co. v. Junis, 196 Iowa 914, 195 N. W. 606 (1923); Nathan Isaas, The Industrial
Purchaser and the Sales Act (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 262.
15. Bank of Taiwan v. Union Nat. Bank of Philadelphia, 1 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 3d,
1924); De Hoff v. Aspegren, 96 Misc. 681, 161 N. Y. Supp. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Carson
Petroleum Co. v. Balboa Trading Co., 120 Misc. 389, 198 N. Y. Supp. 556 (Sup. Ct.
1923); E. L. Rice & Co. v. Roberts, 172 S. E. 615 (W. Va., 1934). The cages which
apparently place most stress on this factor are Littlejohn v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188, 53 N.
E. 810 (1899); Rochevot v. Wolf, 96 App. Div. 506, 89 N. Y. Supp. 142 (4th Dep't 1904);
Brown & Bigelow v. Bard, 64 Misc. 249, 118 N. Y. Supp. 371 (County Court, 1909);
Granger Co. v. Universal Machinery Corp., 193 App. Div. 234, 183 N. Y. Supp. 711 (2d
Dep't, 1920).
16. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 302.
17. Oakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Wolf Co., 118 Fed. 239 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902) (defects,
though not known before suit, were not latent, could have been discovered by diligent
inspection, and therefore cannot be urged as a defense); Germain Fruit Co. v, Roberts
& Co., 8 Pa. Super. 500 (1898) (defense of late shipment, date of shipment not being
known before trial due to S's negligence. Held, late arrival should have resulted In
inquiry into time of shipment, and then B could have protested on that ground. Having
protested and induced an arbitration on another ground, defense of time must be con-
sidered waived.); see Tuggle v. Green & Sons, 150 Ga. 361, 370, 104 S. E. 85, 89 (1920);
Miller v. Ungerer & Co., 188 App. Div. 655, 658, 176 N. Y. Supp. 850, 852 (2d Dep't,
1919) (defendant should have known at the time that receipt was non-negotiable). But
see O'Donohue v. Leggett, 55 Hun 607, 8 N. Y. Supp. 426, 430 (Sup. Ct. 1889) (tags
indicating deficiency were not seen by B apparently because of his own negligence and were
therefore not known to him until trial. Held, objection to deficiency not precluded.) But see
concurring opinion of Davis, P. J., id. at 431. Aff'd O'Donohue v. Leggett, 134 N. Y. 40,
31 N. E. 269 (1892), where the deficiency was not considered material.
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knowledge at the time of protestation, and these few then proceed as
though there were. The others do not even bother to mention the fact
that there was no actual knowledge. A court would seem to be justified
in so proceeding.
But where the seller has knowledge of the unstated defects, he should
be prepared to litigate them regardless of whether the buyer has stated
them originally; for there seems little to ground an estoppel as to such
defenses. It might be said that the seller has been led to litigate in the
belief that only the defects stated would be relied on at the trial. But
there being no reasonable basis for him so to presume,is this argument
seems to be but an assumption of the conclusion. For the court to
make such a presumption for him seems unjustified. In such matters as
defects in shipment, late performance, and general defenses to a suit,
such as "meeting of the minds," the seller may safely be presumed to
have as much knowledge as the buyer. Although there is very little men-
tion in the cases themselves of such knowledge of the seller, there ap-
pears to be some tendency to allow the buyer to set up as defenses to the
seller's suit defects in performance of which the seller is presumed to
have cognizance."9 Certainly is this true of general defenses to the suit,
18. Save so far as the effect of normal commercial leeway is felt. As to this, Llewellyn,
What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective (1931) 40 YAI.n L. J. 704, especially at
722. Llewellyn points out that while the law seeks inflexible measures of performante,
non-legal obligation is flexible within a "range of permissible variation,' which, before
narrowing by either party pending performance, is wider, and even after narrowing, may
still be wider than the range commonly recognized at law; and that the law is arbitrary
in so far as it does not act in the light of these practices4 Commercial leeway is ex-
tremely difficult to demonstrate in any single case. It is based on a series of dealing
in the given industry or between the given individuals in the courme of which the defect
in question has appeared but the performance was accepted nevertheless. Unle thLs
is shown, it is hazardous to assume commercial leeway in any case as to the particular
defect, except in so far as the buyer expressly states that be would have received the goods,
despite the defect, in normal times. See in this connection Peterson Bros. v. Mineral
King Fruit Co., 140 Cal. 624, 74 Pac. 162 (1903), in which plaintiff testified that had the
market not gone down he would have accepted, because he could put stuff through on a
rising market that he could not on a falling.
19. In this connection compare the following two lines of cases. Mengel & Bros. Co. v.
Handy Chocolate Co., 10 F. (2d) 293 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926) (late tender not precluded);
Western Grocer Co. v. New York Oversea Co., 28 F. (2d) 518 (N. D. Cal. 1928) (defects
in drafts known to S); Tascott v. Rosenthal, 10 IlL App. 639 (1882) (shipment ahead of
time not "waived" because not stated); St. John Bros. Co. v. Falkson, 237 Mass. 399,
130 N.- E. 51 (1921) (delivery to wrong carrier not precluded); Woldert Grocery Co.
v. Pillman, 191 Mo. App. 15, 176 S. W. 457 (1915) (delivery at wrong place); Fowler
v. Cobb, 232 S. W. 1084 (Mo. App., 1921) (defect in quality known to the seller); Sabin
Robbins Paper Co. v. Cal Hirsch & Sons Mercantile Co., 263 S. W. 479 (Mo. App., 1924)
(late shipment); O'Donohue v. Leggett, 55 Hun 607, 8 N. Y. Supp. 426 (Sup. Ct. 18S9)
(deficiency in quantity apparently known to the seller, or should have been known-
tags on bags); Brown & Bigelow v. Bard, 64 Misc. 249, 118 N. Y. Supp. 371 (County
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which, both because of the presumptive knowledge of the seller and the
impossibility of obviation, should under no theory be considered aban-
doned because of non statement.20
With respect to all these fact situations, those courts that do theorize
reason on the basis of estoppel2l or something that they call "waiver."
The application of one theory does not necessarily exclude the other
in the same jurisdiction; and in the same case a court will often men-
tion both as good law, while applying one. 22  Estoppel, indeed, has
been thought to be the reason for the rule.23 It is, however, doubtful
whether the facts in most of the cases show any actual basis for the
application of that doctrine.2 1 "Estoppel" here usually appears to be
Ct. 1909) (defect in quantity known to the seller held not precluded); Petersburg Fire
Brick & Tile Co. v. American Clay Machinery Co., 89 Ohio St. 365, 106 N. E. 33 (1914)
(defect in manner of shipment not precluded). But compare the following: Higgins
v. California Prune & Apricot Growers, 16 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (method of
delivery; but note that original rejection was as to price); Cobb Lumber Co. v. Sunny
South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E. 759 (1926) (time of shipment; but note
that the reason given was that the price was too high); Armsby Co. v. Raymond Bros.-
Clarke Co., 90 Neb. 553, 134 N.. W. 174 (1912) (improper delivery; but note that the
reason given for rejection was the poor market); Keswlck v. Rafter, 35 App. Dlv. 508,
54 N. Y. Supp. 850 (1st Dep't, 1898) (shipment by different route); Hess v. Knufherr,
128 App. Div. 526, 112 N. Y. Supp. 832 (1st Dep't, 1908) (late shipment); Germain
Fruit Co. v. Roberts & Co., 8 Pa. Super. 500 (1898) (same); United Fruit Co. v. Bisese,
25 Pa. Super. Ct. 170 (1904) (excess quantity known to the seller). As to defects in
shipment, watch for such things as negligent shipping clerk.
20. Mente v. De Witt Rice Mill Co., 251 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) ("meeting of the
minds"); Interstate Iron & Steel Co. v. Northwestern Bridge & Iron Co., 278 Fed. 50
(C. C. A. 7th, 1922) (invalidity of the contract); Union Brokerage Co. v. Beall Bros,
30 Ga. App. 748, 119 S. E. 533 (1923) (failure of consideration); Bates v. Cashman,
230 Mass. 167, 119 N. E. 663 (1918) (false representations; a stock case) ; see Savannah
Chemical Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 293 Fed. 145, 147 (C. C. A 5th, 1923) ("waiver"
mentioned only as to one defense not stated at the time of repudiation, but not to the
one that the contract was unilateral and void, on which point evidence was admitted).
But compare a recent case holding a general defense precluded. Siegel v. Waynesboro
Knitting Co., 7 F. Supp. 693 (S. D. N. Y. 1934), criticized (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 106,
21. See cases note 13, supra; Oakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Wolf Co., 118 Fed. 239 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1902), cited note 17, supra; Second Nat. Bank of Allegheny v. Lash Corp., 299
Fed. 371 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924) (stressing "examination of the record" to find an cstoppel,
then finding none in the facts but presuming one as the natural result of silence, though
pointing out that had the defendant given no reason at all, he could defend on any
ground he chose) ; Germain Fruit Co. v. Roberts & Co., 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 500 (1898), cited
note 17, supra.
22. See in this connection, Oakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Wolf Co., 118 Fed. 239 (C. C. A.
6th, 1902); Granger Co. v. Universal Machinery Corp., 193 App. Div. 234, 183 N. Y,
Supp. 711 (2d Dep't, 1920); List & Son Co. v. Chase, 80 Ohio St. 42, 88 N. E. 120
(1909); Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va. 123, 126 S. E. 231 (1925).
23. 2 WiLLIsToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §§ 494a, 495.
24. Few of the cases cited in note 21, supra, point out any action that the plaintiff hag
taken in reliance on the fact that only the stated objections would be relied on by the
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the label for a result that the court wishes to reach rather than a justi-
fiable inference from the facts. And in most instances, even if all the
necessary elements for an estoppel were present, including action in reli-
ance to the actor's damage, it is doubtful whether such reliance on the
part of the seller would be reasonable. An assumption on the part of
the seller that the buyer is going to rely solely on the defects he has
mentioned seems unwarranted, both because it is not grounded in facte
and because-under existing (though unfortunate) law-the buyer is
defendant in defending the lawsuit. Those that do, Rochevot v. Wolf, 96 App. Div. 505,
89 N. Y. Supp. 142 (4th Dep't, 1904), and United Fruit Co. v. Bisese, 25 Pa. Supzr. 170
(1904), both cited in note 13, supra, fail to show in what way the plaintiff has baen
damaged by that action. In those cases that stress the fact of litigation, why indeed
should a plaintiff recover who would not have litigated had he known all the facts? Why
should he not be under a duty to inquire as to all the defenses that the defendant might
have before suing? Why should he not be under a duty to perform strictly according
to the contract, except in so far as the factor of commercial leeway is involved? Should
the buyer be penalized because of the mistake of the seller who perhaps is "trying to
put one over on him," suing before the buyer discovers all the defects? And if it b2
thought the seller has been misled into litigation because of the unstated defects when
he would not otherwise have brought suit, wherein would he be damaged if the action
were dismissed and its costs imposed on the buyer? Some cases whose facts do shov,
action on the part of the seller induced by the stated objections do not proceed on the
theory of estoppel. Drucklieb v. Universal Tobacco Co., 106 App. Div. 470, 94 N. Y. Supp.
777 (1st Dep't, 1905) (reduction of price); De Hoff v. Aspegren, 96 Misc. 651, 161 N.
Y. Supp. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (arbitration; proceeding on the theory of vaiver). But cf.
Germain Fruit Co. v. Roberts & Co., 8 Pa. Super 500 (1898) (arbitration mentioned and
estoppel theory used).
None of the cases specifically point out any action that the plaintiff has refrained from,
owing to the defendant's conduct. As to the obviation of defects, all the factors that
should first be considered, and which are not considered, even before we inquire whether
the seller would have acted but for the buyer's statement, are set forth in note 7, supra.
Nor do the cases set forth clearly that the buyer's reasons were a but-for cause of the
seller's inaction. Where the buyer's reasons did actually operate as such a but-for cause.
there is meaning in the rule. See in this connection Knox v. Schoenthal, 59 Hun
620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Second Nat. Bank of Allegheny v. Lash Corp.,
299 Fed. 371 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
25. Several exceptions must be made to this statement. One is where the factor of com-
mercial leeway is involved; where the buyer would have accepted in spite of the defect,
had times been normal. Another exception is the line of cases in which the buyer has
said in effect to the seller, "If you remedy this defect, I will accept." Here such an
assumption may be warranted. See in this connection Peterson Bros. v. Mineral King
Fruit Co., 140 Cal. 624, 74 Pac. 162 (1903); Linger v. Wilson, 73 W. Va. 669, S0 S. E.
1108 (1914), cited in note 12, supra, (assuming the court's interpretation of the facts).
Another possible exception might be where the buyer offers a lower price to the seller,
for the lower price might often be considered a remedy of the defect stated, and therefore
substantially like the first situation - often, not always, e4g., where a drop in the market
or a lack of funds is mentioned. See in this connection Cobb Lumber Co. v. Sunny
South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E. 759 (1926) (offer of a lower price); OlceF2
v. Mobile Fruit & Trading Co., 112 Ill. App. 281 (1904) (same).
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under no duty at all to disclose the defects in the seller's performance.3
To penalize an honest buyer who speaks, however hastily, seems doubly
unfair when a rogue who sits silent can defend a seller's action on any
ground that he sees fit. The estoppel theory is most satisfactorily used
as a means of getting away from the rigid ride, the court in such in-
stances declaring that the reason of the rule against the setting up of
unstated objections is estoppel, and that the facts of the particular case
do not show an estoppel, which is most often true.
2 7
What has been said of estoppel is equally true of "waiver." Certainly
"waiver" in this situation labels no distinct legal principle, and certainly
not what is ordinarily meant by that term. Waiver ordinarily connotes
the "intentional relinquishment of a known right"2 8 without the necessity
for consideration. It can rarely be said with reason that a person has
intentionally abandoned a possible defense that he might have to a law-
suit." The term "waiver" is evidently the term by which the courts
justify loosely a conclusive presumption that all other defenses are
abandoned when the buyer states only some.
Courts dissatisfied with the rigid rule as followed in most of the cases
have found several means of getting away from it. There are first the
26. Nelson v. Imperial Trading Co., 69 Wash. 442, 125 Pac. 777 (1912); see Second
Nat. Bank of Allegheny v. Lash Corp., 299 Fed. 371, 373 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924); 2 WILLIXSTOX,
CONTRACTS (1920) § 744; 2 WILISmToN, SALES, (2d ed. 1924) § 495. But note that the
author is not supporting the "no duty to disclose" rule. The reasoning is from one
poor (but existing) rule to another. The logical conclusion is to change both. Cf. CAL.
Civ. CODE, (Deering, 1931) § 1501 and CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 2076.
27. Mente v. De Witt Rice Mill Co., 251 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Mengel &
Bro. Co. v. Handy Chocolate Co., 10 F. (2d) 293 (C. C. A. ist, 1926); Carter-Moss Lum-
ber Co. v. Lomax, 30 Ga. 718, 119 S. E. 534 (1923); Drew v. Breedlove, 30 Ga. App. 722,
119 S. E. 532 (1923); Union Brokerage Co. v. Beall Bros., 30 Ga. App. 748, 119 S. E. 533
(1923); Tufts v. McClure Bros., 40 Iowa 317 (1875); Bates v. Cashman, 230 Mas, 167,
119 N. E. 663 (1918) (sale of stock case and court considered defendant had expressly
reserved different grounds in his letter of protestation); Noble v. Pirson, 204 Mich, 306,
169 N. W. 860 (1918); List & Son Co. v. Chase, 80 Ohio St. 42, 88 N. E. 120 (1909) (held,
B could wait till arrival to object to defects, though known to him before, since the defect
could not have been remedied at either time, the rule as to waiver of unstated objections
operating only where there is estoppel or a real waiver); Petersburg Fire Brick & Tile
Co. v. American Clay Machinery Co., 89 Ohio St. 365, 106 N. E. 33 (1914); see Tascott
v. Rosenthal, 10 Ill. App. 639, 642 (1882); Lefferts v. Weld, 167 Mass. 531, 536, 46 N. E.
107, 108 (1897) (intimation that had the plaintiff relied on the omission to his damage,
result would have been contra) ; Price v. Engelke, 68 N. J. L. 567, 570, 53 Ati. 698, 699
(1902); Jardella v. Welin Davit & Boat Corp., 219 App. Div. 353, 360, 220 N. Y. Supp.
115, 121 (2d Dep't, 1927).
28. See Mengel & Bro. Co. v. Handy Chocolate Co., 10 F. (2d) 293, 296 (C. C. A.
1st, 1926).
29. In the situations presented in note 25, supra, an abandonment of a defense might
be worked out: the reduction in price or the remedying of the defect compensating for the
loss; and commercial leeway, acquiesced in, being good reason for barring purely legal-
istic objection.
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-courts that openly repudiate that mechanically applied doctrine.^ These
are the brave few that have cropped up every now and then. There
are those that hold that the buyer may set up such defenses as he chooses
where he has rejected generally; 31 those that hold that an insistence by
the seller that the buyer perform after he repudiates indicates non-acqui-
escence in the repudiation, keeping the contract alive so that other de-
fenses may be brought in;32 those that consider the defect in performance
a breach that could not be eradicated or changed by anything that the
buyer said or did;33 those that leave the question of waiver to the jury
as a question of fact;34 and at least one that says by way of dicta that
it does not apply except where there is an enforceable contract.s All
30. Woldert Grocery Co. v. Pillman, 191 Mo. App. 15, 176 S. W. 457 (1915 (assigna-
tion of one reason does not do away with the necessity on the part of S of showing full
performance to recover, citing Ungerer & Co. v. Louis Maull Cheese & Fish Co., 155 Mo.
App. 95, 134 S. W. 56 (1911), cited note 4, supra); Sabin Robbins Paper Co. v. Cal Hirsch
& Sons Mercantile Co., 263 S. W. 479 (Mo. App. 1924); Price v. Engelke, 6S N. J. L.
567, 53 AtI. 698 (1902) (unless S made such delivery as was performance on his part, B
could reject, the reasons operating in his mind for rejecting being of no moment, there
being nothing to show they were communicated to S or that S was in any way miLed);
Perry v. Aft. Hope Iron Co., 16 R. I. 318, 15 At. 87 (1888); Prescott & Co. v. J. B.
Powles & Co., 113 Wash. 177, 193 Pac. 6S0 (1920), cited note 4, supra. The emphasis of
this case on the suit for the purchase price and its citation of Inman, Akers & Inman v.
Elk Cotton Mills, 116 Tenn. 141, 92 S. W. 760 (1906), stressing the point that the plain-
tiff had not acquiesced in the buyer's repudiation of the contract, may be considered as
showing a tendency to hold that a suit for the price indicates the nonacquiescence of the
seller in the buyer's repudiation, so that the buyer may bring in other defenses. S-
Williams Cooperage Co. v. Scofield, 115 Fed. 119, 121 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); Strasbourger
v. Leerburger, 233 N. Y. 55, 60, 134 N. E. 834, 836 (1922).
31. Noble v. Pirson, 204 Mich. 306, 169 N. W. 860 (1918) (a letter saying that if the
stock had been as guaranteed B would have made money but now would lose, following
a telegram that customers would not accept and a letter enumerating defects, held to
be a claim they did not comply with the contract, which B could prove); Jardella v.
Welin Davit & Boat Corp., 219 App. Div. 353, 220 N. Y. Supp. 113 (2d Dep't, 1927) (re-
jection for specified defects and because the boat showed careless construction and poor
workmanship held to be, in the circumstances, broad enough to cover every defect proved
by B in suit to recover the price, the S, moreover, not objecting to proof of the defects
on the ground of surprise).
32. Richard v. Haebler, 36 App. Div. 94, 55 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1st Dep't, 1899); In-
ternational Cheese Co. v. Garra, 107 Misc. 344, 176 N. Y. Supp. 523 (Sup. Ct. 1919);
Inman, Akers & Inman v. Elk Cotton Mills, 116 Tenn. 141, 92 S. W. 760 (1905).
33. Tascott v. Rosenthal, 10 III. App. 639 (1882); cf. Aetna Explosives Co. v. Diamond
Alkali Co., 277 Pa. 392, 121 At!. 201 (1923) (S not precluded from objecting to the past
delay in giving a required monthly notice, though it did not so complain in its letter of
cancellation, since as to the past month the contract was not cancelled, but executed, and
the rights of the parties thereunder had been fixed).
34. Tufts v. McClure Bros., 40 Iowa 317 (1875); St. John Bros. Co. v. Falkson, 237
Mass. 399, 130 N. E. 51 (1921), cited note 11, supra; cf. Cawley v. Weiner, 236 N. Y.
357, 140 N. E. 724 (1923) (not a sale of goods case).
35. See Keiser & Son Co. v. Hallock, 201 App. Div. 186, 188, .190, 194 N. Y. Supp.
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these cases indicate that dissatisfaction with the rigid rule is causing the,
courts to work toward its modification.3"
III
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
As Professor Williston has pointed out, the doctrine that refusing per-
formance for one reason precludes setting up other reasons is not pecu-
liar to the law of Sales." It has been applied in the fields of Vendor and
Purchaser, 8 Insurance,29 Factors and Brokers,40 and cases where a
tender of money is made and refused on one ground or another.41 Many
of the cases which have invoked the doctrine in fields where it is more
or less justifiable have been used as precedents by the courts which
737, 739, 741 (3d Dep't, 1922), in which Kellogg, J., concurring says that the rule of
Littlejohn v. Shaw does not prevent reliance upon the Statute of Frauds as a defense at
trial, although the rejection has been made upon other grounds.
36. Only one state, California, has seen fit to legislate on this subject. The pertinent
section of the Civil Code is Section 1501 (Deering, 1931), and of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure is Section 2076 (Deering, 1931):
§ 1501: "Al objections to the mode of an offer of performance, which the creditor lias
an opportunity to state at the time to the person making the offer, and which could be
then obviated by him, are waived by the creditor, if not then stated."
§ 2076: "The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, specify any objection
he may have to the money, instrument, or property, or he must be deemed to have waived
it; and if the objection be to the amount of money, the terms of the instrument, or the
amount or kind of property, he must specify the amount, terms or kind which he re-
quires, or be precluded from objecting afterwards."
The "which could be obviated" clause of Section 1501 has been held to be a qualification
of Section 2076. Young v. Rocha, 65 Cal. App. 15, 222 Pac. 861 (1923).
Even before the statute was passed, there was no strong case in California applying the
rigid rule which this reviewer has found. Peterson Bros. v. Mineral King Fruit Co., 140
Cal. 624, 74 Pac. 162 (1903), appears to be an express waiver case. After the statute there
appears to have been a closer scrutiny on the part of the courts in order to see whether
the defects actually could have been obviated or not, apparently the result of having the
fact impressed upon them by the statute. Young v. Rocha, supra; Ward-Lewis Lumber
Co. v. Mahoney, 70 Cal. App. 708, 234 Pac. 417 (1925) (confining the statute to the mode
of performance, and tending to arrive at a still more liberal rule).
It is perhaps fortunate that a poorly conceived Iowa statute has never been extended
to a Sales case on this point, for it embodies the rigid waiver rule. IowA Coo (1931)
§ 9450.
37. 2 WrLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 494b.
38. Davis & Rankin Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Dix, 64 Fed. 406 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1894);
Higgins v. Eagleton, 155 N. Y. 466, 50 N. E. 287 (1898); Haney v. Hatfield, 241 Pa. 413,
88 Atl. 680 (1913).
39. Union Fraternal League v. Sweeney, 184 Ind. 378, 111 N. E. 305 (1916); see Mc-
Cormick & Sons v. Royal Insurance Co., 163 Pa. 184, 193, 29 Ad. 747, 750 (1894).
40. Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. 169 (N. Y. 1840); Winter v. Coit, 7 N. Y. 288
(1852).
41. Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9 (1860); 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRcTs (1920) § 1819.
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sought to apply the doctrine to the law of Sales. Such a use of prece-
dents, unless the situations are very similar, is an evil to which the
"common law" system is prone.4 2' This field is no exception to the rule.
The theory of "waiver" of unstated objections had its inception in Eng-
land. But it is important to note that it arose in the English "money-
tender" cases and before England had Sales cases to which to apply
the rule. Wright v. Reed,43 the earliest decision discovered, was a case
in which a tender of bank-notes was held to be a good tender if no objec-
tion was made on that score, there being a question at the time whether
bank-notes were legal tender. This case was closely followed by that of
Lockyer v. Jones," in which an objection as to the amount of the tender
of money was deemed a waiver of any objection to the form of tender,
Lord Kenyon saying that had the latter objection been made, the de-
fendant might have taken the money from his pocket and tendered it,
thus correcting the defect. Later,40 in Polglass v. Oliver," the court
again used the same argument.
When Sales cases finally arose in England in which the doctrine
could be employed, the English courts on the whole refused to apply
42. As an example, without intimating that the rule was justifiable in this particular case,
Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258 (1877), might be cited. That was an action for
damages for "negligence in the execution of a contract of affreightment," and yet it has
been cited by many Sales cases as authority for their holdings.
42 . CL LE ELLYN, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at 98.
43. 3 T. R. 554 (K. B. 1790).
44. Peake 238, note (N. P. 1796).
45. Lockyer v. Jones, Peake, 238 note (N. P. 1796) was followed by Grigby v. Oakes,
2 Bos. & P. 526, 529 (C. P. 1801), which was an action on a promissory note. Chambre, J.
said obiter: "It has been thought that the courts went a great way in holding a tender in
bank notes to be a good tender, if not objected to at the time [citing Wright v. Reed, 3
T. R. 554 (K. B. 1790)]. Certainly that was an innovation, though a beneficial one."
Next followed Boardman v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410 n. (N. P. 1803), an action of trover with
a refusal by the defendant to deliver, on the ground that the goods were his own prop-
erty, and a defense, asserted later, that there was warehouse rent due the defendant. Lord
Ellenborough said that as the detention was on a different ground, and no demand for
the rent had been made, defendant must be taken to have waived his lien, if he had
one. Then came Tiley v. Courtier, 2 C. & J. 15, note (Ex. 1817) with a holding similar
to Lockyer v. Jones, supra. In White v. Gainer, 2 Bing. N. C. 23 (C. P. 1824) Best, C. J.,
while approving the case of Boardman v. Sill, supra, refused to apply its doctrine to the
case where the defendant said, "If I deliver them I may as well give up every transaction
of my life" and later stated that if the lien had been settled he would have delivered.
Best said that Boardman v. Sill, supra, applied only where the defendant gave a spacific
reason for refusal at the time, as "It is my property."
46. 2 C. & J. 14 (Ex. 1831); followed by Richardson v. Jackson, 8 Al. & W. 297 (Ex.
1841), with a similar holding. Then in Flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare 618 (V. C. 1852), a Ven-
dor and Purchaser case, the court said that a party to a contract becoming aware of an
objection to the validity of the contract must state it forthwith as an objection on which he
means to resist performance, or be considered to have waived it. Then came the first
Sales case to involve the doctrine, Levy v. Green, 1 El. & El. 969 (Ex. 1859).
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their "money-tender" precedents to the performance of a contract for
the sale of goods. Thus in Levy v. Green,47 a defendant rejecting be-
cause of delay in shipment was allowed to defend on the ground that
the goods shipped contained goods of a different description. In Manbre
Saccharine Co., Ltd. v. Corn Products Co., Ltd.,4" the court said that the
plaintiffs were not, by the rejection of the tender on an insufficient
ground, precluded from supporting the tender on other and valid grounds.
The court in Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co.,40 observed: "It is a
long established rule of law that a contracting party who, after he has
become entitled to refuse performance of his contractual obligations,
gives a wrong reason for his refusal, does not thereby deprive himself of
a justification which in fact existed, whether he was aware of it or not,"
and this principle applies to a contract for the sale of goods60
47. 1 El. & El. 969 (Ex. Ch. 1859). This case was followed by Tamvaco v. Lucas, 1
B. & S. 185 (Q. B. 1861), in which del credere agents, on tender of documents, denied
being such, the price having fallen. At trial they set up defective tender as a defense. The
court held tender was good, Cockburn, C. J., gratuitously adding that the defect was waived
since remediable. In Sanders Bros. v. MacLean & Co., 11 Q. B. D. 327 (1883), the court
said that whether the reasons given at trial for rejecting two tenders of shipping documents
were the true ones was unnecessary to determine, as, if they were legal reasons, defendant
-could rely on them. The court in Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co., [1905] 2 K, B.
.543, said that an absolute repudiation of the contract by B before arrival of the goods
amounted to a waiver of the performance of conditions precedent by S; and B could not
insist S was unable to perform such conditions, and that if he had known the facts he
might have rejected the first installment of the goods upon their arrival. Mathew, L. J.,
said that in a business sense B had no real cause for complaint. See the explanation of this
case in Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co., 38 T. L. R. 349 (K. B. 1922). In the charter-
-party case of Furness, Withy & Co. v. Rederiaktiegolabet Banco, [1917] 2 K, B. 873, an
objection made for the first time at the trial was allowed by the court.
48. (1919] 1 K. B. 198. After replying, to plaintiff's demand, that they knew of no
goods for plaintiff, defendants shipped anyway and forwarded invoices & B/Ls dated
March 14 which were refused on the ground the ship had been sunk March 12, and the
defendants must have known of it when they sent the invoices. In giving judgment for
-plaintiff, the court cited Sanders Bros. v. MacLean & Co., 11 Q. B. D. 327 (1883), and
Furness, Withy & Co. v. Rederiaktiegolabet Banco, [1917] 2 K. B. 873, both dted note
47, supra.
49. 38 T. L. R. 349, 351 (K. B. 1922). Rejection because customers refused delivery.
After suit, defendant claimed goods were defective. Judgment for the plaintiff since the
court found the goods were not far short of the contract quality, that but for a fall In
the price they would have been accepted, and that the defect perhaps could have been
Temedied if made known. Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co., [1905] 2 K, B. 543,
cited note 47 supra, was distinguished, in finding that the defense was not precluded for
nonstatement, on the ground that that case dealt merely with an offer to hand over a bill
of lading, and not with an actual tendered delivery, and that that was different from
'holding a breach already committed waived. In Hansson v. Hamel & Horley, 10 Ll. L.
L. Rep. 507 (H. L. 1922), the court said that the reason why the buyers really refused the
,documents does not matter, nor did the case turn on the particular objection put forth
by them at the time.
50. Note the tendency in the English cases to hold those who are trying to squirm
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The doctrine was imported from England into America through the
"money-tender" cases and before the English Sales cases arose.51 There
thus resulted the anomalous situation of the American courts relying
on inapposite English precedents as authority for their holdings, while
the English courts, with their usual judgment, refused to apply their
own "money-tender" precedents to their Sales cases. The English
courts apparently realized that different considerations applied to dif-
ferent situations. If A refuses B's tender of money on the ground that
it comes too late, and then, on finding that the tender was not too late,
defends on the ground the money tendered was not legal tender, per-
haps A should be precluded from so defending on the theory that E
would have changed his money into legal tender and performed had that
objection been made. We can make this assumption with far more
certainty in such cases than we can in a Sales case, where a retender in-
volves time, money, and a possibility of loss by depreciation. A retender
of cash is much easier than a reshipment of 150 tons of iron; and it is
safe to assume that a retender in the money case will almost always be
made, and that it can be made within the necessary time. This histori-
cal anomaly, of utmost importance in any argument against the theory,
has however nowhere been noted, either by protagonists or antagonists
of the doctrine.
Starting out with the misapplication of the English "money-tender"
cases in the New York case of Gould v. Banks & Gould in 1832, 12 the
rule continued unformulated for the most part till the very end of the
nineteenth century. It is not until Littlejohn v. Shaw, in 1899, that the
statement of the rule in the definite form in which it appears in that
out of their contracts, as in the cases of Tamvaco v. Lucas, 1 B. & S. 185 (Q. B. iS61);
Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 543, both cited note 47, supra;
Alanbre Saccharine Co. Ltd. v. Corn Products Co. Ltd., [1919] 1 K. B. 198, cited note 49,
supa; and Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co., 38 T. L. R. 349 (K. B. 1922).
Australia too has followed the English view and refused to apply the doctrine. Massey
v. Arlitz (1923) 44 Aust. L. T. 145, noted (1924) 24 COL. L. Rnv. 391.
51. Apparently the first case in the United States to apply the rule to the Sales situa-
tion is Gould v. Banks & Gould, 8 Wend. 562, 567 (N. Y. 1s32), in which the court aidl
that by putting his refusal to accept tender of books on the ground of untnerchantabilitir
the plaintiff waived all other objections to the tender, such as previous failure to tender
on time, and this, despite the fact that there was evidence that, unless the buyer's mariet
was promptly supplied, it was gone. The court cited Wright v. Reed, 3 T. R. 554 (L B
1790), cited supra note 43, and Grigby v. Oakes, 2 Bos. & P. 526 (C. P. 1801), cited supra
note 45. One eitation, 6 Bac. 450, could not be located. This case has been thought by
many American courts to be the grandfather of the doctrine; and the fact that it, the
first, rests on the English cases, supports the theory as to borrowing.
52. 8 Wend. 562 (N. Y. 1832), cited note 51, supra. The case might have been decided
on the basis of an express waiver. By permitting a retender, though objecting to it on
some other ground, the buyer might be considered to have expressly waived a previous
failure to tender.
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case is found.53  The period previous to that was one of groping, in
which certain courts sought to prevent the buyer from setting up the
unstated defects at the time of trial. Many of these courts did so be-
cause of a peculiar fact situation, as where there was apparently an ex-
press waiver,54 or where the court felt that the true objection was a
drop in the market price.55 Others did so because of a feeling that
the buyer in withholding all his objections was acting unfairly and really
had no just complaint to make against the performance of the seller.'
Almost all the cases in this period are explicable on some ground other
than the broad one that giving one reason is deemed to be a "waiver"
of all others, or they enunciated some principle that was very different
from the one voiced by Littlejohn v. Shaw.5 7 Note too that all during
this period of hesitant growth many of the courts permitted the buyer
to set up his unstated objections.5 8
It was towards the end of the nineteenth century that the scattered
53. See page 782, supra. Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258 (1877), had a definit
statement of the rule, but it was not a Sales case. Its statement differed from that in Little-
iohn v. Shaw in that it stressed the commencement of litigation and the theory of estoppel.
Railway Co. v. McCarthy, moreover, was never cited as authority in a Sales case till after
the decision in Littlejohn v. Shaw, so that the statement to which this is the footnote Is
technically correct, limited as it is to Sales cases.
54. Gould v. Banks & Gould, 8 Wend. 562 (N. Y. 1832); Downer v. Thompson, 6 Hill
208 (N. Y. 1843). Strong, S., said that in the letter rejecting, under advice of counsel,
only for bad quality there was express compliance as to the unstated defect.
55. Downer v. Thompson, 6 Hill 208 (N. Y. 1843); Hayden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426
(1873).
56. Meincke v. Falk, 61 Wis. 623, 21 N. W. 785 (1884).
57. Sutton v. Risser, 104 Iowa 631, 74 N. W. 23 (1898) (court felt that the unstated
,defect was nonexistent anyway); Gould v. Banks & Gould, 8 Wend. 562 (N. Y. 1832),
cited note 52, supra; Downer v. Thompson, 6 Hill 208 (N. Y. 1843), cited note 54, supra;
Hayden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426 (1873) (defect remediable); Smith v. Pettee, 70 N. Y.
13 (1877) (S could still have performed had the defect been noted); Knox v. Schoenthal,
59 Hun 620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct., 1891) (defect remediable if noted, says the
court; substantial compliance as to defect); Germain Fruit Co. v. Roberts & Co., 8 Pa.
Super. 500 (1898) (estoppel theory); Steeper v. Frieberg, Klein & Co., 3 Civ. Cas. § 240
(Tex. App. 1887) (objection not made in reasonable time).
58. Tascott v. Rosenthal, 10 Ill. App. 639 (1882), cited note 33, supra; Tufts v. Mc-
Clure Bros., 40 Iowa 317 (1875), cited note 27, supra; Bryant v. Thesing, 46 Neb. 244,
64 N. W. 967 (1895); Newbery v. Furnival, 56 N. Y. 638 (1874), cited note 4, supra;
Hill v. Heller, 27 Hun 416 (N. Y. 1882); Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co., 16 R. I. 318, 1
AtI. 87 (1888), cited note 30, supra; cf. Voorman v. Voight, 46 Cal. 392, 398 (1873) (re-
jection because price too high, and averment that packages were no good); Kaufman v.
Austin & Co., 57 Ga. 87 (1876); see Lefferts v. Weld, 167 Mass. 531, 536, 46 N. E. 107,
108 (1897); Everett v. Coffin & Cartwright, 6 Wend. 603, 608 (N. Y. 1831) (proceeding
on the basis that the defendant never put his right on a distinct separate ground, but
merely stated the facts, and that therefore there was no waiver of an unstated defense);
O'Donohue v. Leggett, 55 Hun 607, 8 N. Y. Supp. 426, 430 (Sup. Ct. 1889), cited note 17,
supra.
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statements of separate cases which had been decided on their particular
facts began to coagulate to form a general ruleY0 This clotting process
culminated in the lower New York court dictum of Keswick v. Rafter,c'
decided the year before Littlejohn v. Shaw. The former case was prob-
ably the inspiration for the disastrous dictum of the latter, which has
provided the springboard for most of the cases which followed. The
dictum of Little john v. Shaw flourished like the green bay tree,"1 and
fostered meaningless citation 2 which swamped the previous strong cases
which had allowed the buyer to set up his unstated defects at the time of
trial. 3 This was because it cast its theory of conclusive presumption of
waiver in the form of a definite, unmistakable rule, 4 which could be easily
maneuvered into position without the necessity of scrutinizing the fact
situations of the cases too closely. 65
But Little john v. Shaw did not achieve its full stature unchallenged.
As has been shown, from the earliest times there were cases differently
decided."5 But these are not to be considered as challenges to that doc-
trine; they mark, rather, the attempt of the early cases to flow into an-
other channel. Frustrated in that attempt they rushed into the bed of
Littlejohn v. Shaw. Once they were there, fresh endeavors were made to
59. The first case to indicate the coagulation of the cases into a rule is that of Knox v.
Schoenthal, 59 Hun 620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1891). There the court said that
when one objection is taken, and there is silence as to others, those others are deemed
to be waived, on the theory that the other party has been misled by this Ailence. The next
case to state the rule in such definite terms was Germain Fruit Co. v. Roberts & Co, 8
Pa. Super. 500 (1898).
60. 35 App. Div. 503, 513, 54 N. Y. Supp. 850, 854 (1st Dep'ts 1898).
61. With variations: meaning those cases that place the theory on grounds of estopp2s.
notes 21 and 27 supra; those that stress the obviation of the defects, note 8, .supra; and
those that stress the commencement of litigation, note 11, supra.
62. In addition to being cited as a direct holding instead of a dictum, Littlejohn v.
Shaw has frequently been said to lay down the same rule as Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 95
U. S. (1877), while we have seen, in note 53, supra, that the latter rule is more liberal.
See in this connection Second Nat. Bank of Allegheny v. Lash Corp., 299 Fed. 371, 372
(C. C. A. 3d, 1924). Littlejohn v. Shaw has also frequently been cited in relation to facts
to which it has little or no bearing. See in this connection Pierson & Co. v. American
Steel Export Co., 194 App. Div. 555, 562, 185 N. Y. Supp. 527, 532 (1st Dep't, 1920);
Keiser & Son Co. v. Hallock, 201 App. Div. 186, 188, 194 N. Y. Supp. 737, 739 (3d Dap't,
1922).
63. Tascott v. Rosenthal, 10 111. App. 639 (1882); Tufts v. McClure Bros., 40 Iowa
317 (1875); Newbery v. Furnival, 56 N. Y. 638 (1874); Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co, 16
R. L 318, 15 At. 87 (1888).
64. See page 782, supra.
65. By this is meant that whereas previously the decissions of the courts were couched
in terms of their individual facts ("In these circumstances the objection is waived"), the
courts now had a general rule which could be used and cited without the necessity of
comparing the case under consideration with the case cited to see whether there was a
difference in their fact situations.
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dam the course at various times. Perhaps the earliest of these attempts
was the case of Ungerer & Co. v. Louis Maull Cheese & Fish Co.,10 a
Missouri case decided in 1911, which disapproved of the general doc-
trine as laid down in the Little john case and in its strongest immediate
follower, Ginn v. Clark Coal Co.67 Since that time, the cases in Missouri
have been decidedly against the prevailing rule."8 In New York, Stras-
bourger v. Leerburger,9 decided in 1922, marks a tendency away from
the strict rule and has been followed in many of the later cases, although
the law on this point in that state is by no means settled or uniform. 0
There are some other states that have apparently never applied the
"waiver" rule or that have overruled it;"1 and all the various formulae
for letting in defenses not discovered till after rejection eat small holes
into the theory, so that some day its complete breakdown may result.12
It is thus evident that there is very little historical justification for the
doctrine of "waiver" of unstated defects. Arising from a misapplication
of inapposite English precedents which the English courts later refused
to follow, passing through a period when there were as many cases allow-
ing the buyer to set up defenses not noted till trial as there were cases
ruling the other way-these latter almost all distinguishable-the rule
r~ceived its chief impetus from the unnecessarily extended ruling of
Little john v. Shaw. But in its later history it has been subjected to an
increasing pressure of contrary holdings and modifications which bid
fair to cause its downfall.
IV
RELATION TO PRICE MOVEMENT
Let us now subject to scrutiny the American cases which are believed
66. 155 Mo. App. 95, 134 S. W. 56 (1911), cited note 4, supra.
67. 143 Mich. 84, 106 N. W. 867 (1906), cited note 6, supra.
68. Woldert Grocery Co. v. Pillman, 191 Mo. App. 15, 176 S. W. 457 (1915), cited
note 30, supra; Fowler v. Cobb, 232 S. W. 1084 (Mo. App. 1921); Sabin Robbins Paper
Co. v. Cal Hirsch Mercantile Co., 263 S. W. 479 (Mo. App. 1924).
69. 233 N. Y. 55, 134 N. E. 834 (1922), cited note 8, supra.
70. The law in New York is, in fact, in hopeless confusion on this doctrine. It is
possible to find strong cases supporting any theory as to when there is and when there
is not a "waiver." The tendency, however, seems to be to work away from the rigid
rule of Littlejohn v. Shaw. O'Meara Co. v. Nat. Park Bank of New York, 239 N. Y.
386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925), proceeds as to this point on the theory that the defects could
have been remedied if noted. It is, however, an unfortunate case in that it injects a cer-
tain amount of new life into what it was to be hoped was a dying rule. See in this
connection Jardella v. Welin Davit & Boat Corp., 219 App. Div. 353, 220 N. Y. Supp.
115 (2d Dep't, 1927). But cf. Hind v. Willich, 127 Misc. 355, 216 N. Y. Supp. 155 (Sup.
Ct. 1926) (holding that some points made for defendant must be disregarded because the
ground specified at the time of rejection must control the disposition of the case).
71. See note 30, supra. Here too might be cited the cases in note 27, supra.
72. See notes 31-35 inclusive, supra.
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by too many courts to have established beyond recall the mechanical,
broad doctrine that unstated objections may not be relied upon at time of
trial even though neither price drop nor any other element is present
which might justify their exclusion. In analyzing these cases it must be
remembered that on a rising market a buyer will seldom reject goods
which are commercially in accordance with the contract, even though
they do not conform strictly in law. The golden promise of profits in-
duces acceptance of a legally defective performance. Rejections on
such a market will occur chiefly when the performance is so defective as
to make a profit impossible. On the other hand, a buyer will often try
to escape from a performance quite within the business understanding
of the contract, though not the legal, if he finds either that he can pur-
chase the very same goods at a cheaper price on the open market or
that his resale market has all but disappeared. The desire to avoid loss
or to make greater profits overcomes the possible desire to be a "square-
shooter" and to shoulder his part of that risk of price fluctuation which
any present contract for future delivery carries, both for the seller, and
for the buyer. In such a situation the buyer will often seize upon any
excuse to avoid being forced to take the goods. This would, or should,
naturally arouse in the courts a suspicion against reasons assigned only
after litigation has commenced, or only after other reasons have been
presented to the seller. It should arouse in them a desire to avoid allow-
ing a business contract, entered with full knowledge of the price fluctua-
tion risk, to be nullified because of commercially trivial reasons for
rejecting. And delay in advancing reasons may be an index of triviality.
Accordingly, it is justifiable to conclude that the factor of economic
depression, where present, has been of considerable if not paramount in-
fluence in determining the result. In fact, in the absence of depression,
many of the cases are entirely unjustifiable. It follows that those cases in
which price drop can be shown to be present should not be regarded as
precedent for unrestrained application of the rule of Little john v. Shaw.
When an effort is made to determine just how many of the reported
cases have contained this element of price decline as a possibly influential
factor in the mind of the court, some difficulty is presented by those de-
cisions in which there is no evidence that any drop in the market price
had been brought to the court's attention. The handling of such cases
necessitates the making of several presuppositions." (1) It must first of
73. It is arguable that none of these assumptions need be made; that all that needs to
be investigated is whether a drop in the market or some other pivotal factor is present in
these cases. But a mere agglomeration of data means nothing unless it can be used to in-
dicate a possible explanation for the conclusion reached by the court. And the indication
of that possible explanation involves the assumptions stated. There are a multitude
of pivotal factors that might be investigated, such as the type of product, the type of
transaction, etc.; but the particular factor of price decline was selected for scrutiny be-
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all be assumed that the court has in some way learned of the market
drop, because otherwise that lively suspicion which is so necessary to
any desire to hold the buyer to the contract would possibly not be aroused.
If the drop has occurred at a time of general financial, commercial, or
industrial stress, it is safe to assume that the court will know of the drop
in the same way that any layman would. But if the drop has occurred
in this particular product only, and at a period when the general level
of prices remained at that stage which may be termed "normal," it is
safe to assume nothing in the absence of definite evidence. (2) However,
passing beyond the bounds of safety and assuming that the court has
knowledge of the drop of this particular product in an otherwise "nor-
mal" market, we must further assume that the court realizes the signifi-
cance of this drop on the desire of the buyer to get out. 4  Beyond the
cases that specifically mention the falling market, the first assumption
may be unwarranted; and outside of those that specifically say that the
drop in the market was the real reason for rejection, it is likewise tread-
ing on dangerous ground to make the second assumption.
But all the necessary assumptions have not yet been stated. (3) Having
supposed that the court has somehow learned of the drop in the market,
that it realizes the significance of the drop on the buyer's actions, that it
understands that pressure is likely to bring out a business man's real
objections to the performance of the contract, and that these factors
arouse in it a desire to prevent the buyer from squirming out of his con-
cause, of all possible pivots, this one would most clearly justify the cases if it be found
to exist. Since this pivot ought to influence judicial decision, the fact that its existence Is
found to be present in a particular case indicates that it may have been a reason or the
reason why the decision went the way it did, even though the court did not make It the
focal point of its argument. Thus the mere fact of its existence affords a ground for dis-
tinguishing away ostensibly binding precedents.
In investigating whether the element of price drop was present as one of the large
group of factors which might have influenced a judge in any given case, it must also be
remembered that a court moves of necessity in two time-planes: the time-plane of the
contract and the breach, and the time-plane of the decision. It is easy to see that the
business conditions of the former alone should influence the court; but trouble arises when
we desert the "shoulds" and come to the "ises." Which influences a court more, a depres-
sion five years ago, or a depression to-day, a depression five years ago or boom times
to-day, the boom times of 1927 or the depression of 1931? Which will color its decision
more, a vague memory of market profits or the present reality of forgotten men? With-
out an exploration into the mind of the individual jurist, no one can tell. But It is one
of the difficulties that must be faced, that perhaps the business conditions at the time of
breach, especially if there is but a slight drop (though important enough to make It worth-
while to sue) in the specific product in an otherwise "normal" market, are overshadowed
by those existing at the time of the decision.
74. Although this would appear to be a safe enough assumption, one cannot overlook
the tendency of many courts to blind themselves to commercial realities in their preoccupa-
tion with mechanical legal abstractions.
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tract, yet fairness requires assuming further (a) that it realizes that
business men are not lawyers and do not see precise legal objections, (b)
that the rejection may have been made in haste, dispatched with the
primary desire to make known the rejection and not the reasons for it,
and that many things may be left unsaid in that hasty epistle in the
honest belief that what has been stated is sufficient to justify the refusal
to perform. (4) And to state a conclusion that it may possibly be because
of the drop in the market that any given case has gone the way it has,
it must be assumed that the latter elements are overbalanced by the
former."5
All of this has been said to indicate the unsubstantial character of
any conclusion that may possibly be reached; to show that the very ex-
traction of a positive conclusion from the mass of data necessitates the
use of these assumptions, none of which is capable of scientific hand-
ling. 7
6
No attention will be paid to the cases which rule in favor of the
buyer. Since the factor of depression, if it is present and if it operates
at all, must work inevitably in favor of the seller, then, where these two
conditions are fulfilled, some other element must be present to cause
any case that goes for the buyer to be decided the way it is. And an
examination of those cases mentioning a depression in price reveals, on
the whole, the presence of such an element.7 Plain disgust with the
75. See note 73, supra.
76. In the subsequent discussion, four distinct types of cases will be perceptible. Typa
1 consists of those cases in which the drop in the price of the commodity between the time
of the contract and breach is considered by the court to be the real reason for the rejection.
Here none of the assumptions is involved in the statement of a positive conclusion. Typ2 2
encompasses those cases in which it is reasonably clear that the court feels that the drop
in the market was the real reason for the rejection but it fails to say so explicitly. Here
possibly the second assumption is involved in the conclusion. Type 3 consists of thors-
cases in which the fall in the market price has been brought to the attention of the court
but for some reason it fals 'to follow through. Here the second assumption is involved. The
cases in Type 4 are those in which there is no evidence in the case that the court in any
way knew of the fall in the price of the specific commodity or of the generally depreczed
business conditions at the time of breach, if such conditions were existent. In this last
type all the assumptions are involved in the statement of any positive conclusion. Cer-
tainly, too, the last assumption applies to all the cases.
77. Thus Williams Cooperage Co. v. Scofield, 115 Fed. 119 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) (a
refusal to ship by the seller with a rise in prices, working out the same way as a refusal
to accept with a drop); Ungerer & Co. v. Louis Maanl Cheese & Fish Co., 155 Mo. App.
95, 134 S. W. 56 (1911). In each there was a lack of knowledge of the defect by the
defendant till after suit was brought. This is a powerful factor working for a ruling in
the defendant's favor, more powerful than the forces working against him: the economic
factor and other adverse elements in the fact situations. Western Grocer Co. v. ,ew York
Oversea Co., 28 F. (2d) 518 (N. D. Cal. 1928), is partly explicable on this ground, and
partly because the defect was not remediable. Outside of these, the others that rule in
favor of the buyer are weak, and no principle can be drawn from them that would operate
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apparent unjustifiableness of the prevailing rule may of itself be sufficient
at times to override even the economic force.18
In the cases decided before Littlejohn v. Shaw," a falling market at
the time of breach appears to be present in most of those ruling that
the buyer cannot set up his unstated objections as defenses to the seller's
suit. In two of them the economic factor was indicated and stressed by
the court. In one case, Downer v. Thompson,0 a New York decision
of 1843, the court specifically says that the rejection was due to a drop
in the market: "The fact which he admitted at the same time, viz. that
he had already bought another lot at one or two shillings less per barrel
indicates more probably the true objection." In Hayden v. Demets,, the
court said, "It is quite evident that the plaintiff was anxious to make
the delivery, because the market price had fallen, and it is equally clear
that the defendants desired to avoid the obligations of its con-
tract for the same reason... [T]he transaction would have been closed
at the time by paying the difference, but for a disagreement as to the
price of copper on that day. It was too late after that to fall back on
the insufficiency of the tender."81  In this last case, the court speaks
against our conclusion. Indeed, the very fact that they are weak or contain factors counter-
vailing the price drop lends that conclusion a strong negative support. See in this connection
Young v. Rocha, 65 Cal. App. 15, 222 Pac. 861 (1923) (decided on the basis of the Califor-
nia statute); Kaufman v. Austin & Co., 57 Ga. 87 (1876); Drew Co. v. Breedlove, 30 Ga.
App. 722, 119 S. E. 532 (1923); Kieser & Son Co. v. Hallock, 201 App. Div. 186, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 737 (3d Dep't, 1922). These are apparently the only cases ruling for the buyer in
which a price drop was mentioned. If the cases going for the buyer show a larger propor-
tion of decisions in which price drop is absent, this would be strong negative evidence in
support of our premise that the economic factor, when known and present, influences the
court, and it would thus support our conclusion that the rulings for the seller are not to
be regarded as precedent in the absence of price drop or other justifying element. See
notes 7, 24, 25, 27, supra.
78. See in this connection Ungerer & Co. v. Louis Maull Cheese & Fish Co., 155 Mo.
App. 95, 134 S. NV. 56 (1911); Fowler v. Cobb, 232 S. W. 1084 (Mo. App. 1921).
79. Littlejohn v. Shaw has been selected as one base-line for a consideration of the cases
because, as has been shown previously, the bold form of the precedent received Its chie!
impetus from that case. Ginn v. Clark Coal Co. has been selected as another base-line
because that case marks what may be termed the high-water mark of this line of precedent.
All that is necessary to enable us to draw a significant conclusion is a showing of the pres-
ence of the economic factor in most of the cases before Littlejohn v. Shaw. If that showing
continues just as strongly in the cases before Ginn v. Clark Coal Co., it indicates that, In-
stead of gathering weight and persuasiveness as precedent, the broad mechanical rule has
been able to muster no greater adherence (without the assistance of price drop or other
justifying element) in this period than in that prior to the Littlejohn case. If the presence
of market decline continues in equal proportion even into the modern cases, still greater
force is added to the conclusion that the rigid waiver rule has not by Its own virtue
succeeded in establishing itself as binding precedent.
80. Hopkins, Senator, in 6 Hill 208, 212 (N. Y. 1843), cited note 54, supra.
81. Church, C. J., in 53 N. Y. 426, 428, 430 (1873) (rejection for inability to pay).
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of the fall in such a way that it is reasonably clear that in its belief the
drop was the real reason for the breach and that that belief was a spur
to its desire to hold the buyer.
In the remaining cases in this period in which the buyer was precluded
from setting up his unstated objections, there is no indication in the case
itself of any drop in the market price of the specific commodity or of
generally depressed business conditions at the time of breach. 2  But in
82. In considering the cases, the following weather barometer of American bu-inq
history from 1818 will be used. The form of the chart and most of the information was
derived from Orro C. LiGEcnim, HrsroRy or Busnrs D.PRrseio:.s (1922). The other
information was gathered from IRVING FisnEx, Boois Aim DrP'nsoNs (1932) and Anium
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by far the majority of the cases in which the date of breach is given,
the breach did in fact occur at a time of general business stress or when
there was a drop in the price of the specific commodity., 3 In one case
in which no date of the breach is given, there was some evidence, though
not clearly brought out, of a declining market, or at least of a fluctuating
market in the product, with the court unwilling to throw its risk on the
seller; 4 in another, there was apparently a feeling on the part of the
court that the buyer was acting in bad faith.8 5 And in the two cases in
83. Name of Case
Gould v. Banks & Gould, 8
Wend. 562 (N. Y. 1832)
Smith v. Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13
(1877)
Meincke v. Falk, 61 Wis. 623,
21 N. W. 785 (1884)
Knox v. Schoenthal, 59 Hun
620, 13 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup.
Ct. 1891)
Keswick v. Rafter, 35 App.
Div. 508, 513, 54 N. Y. Supp.
850, 854 (1st Dep't, 1898) d.
Germain Fruit Co. v. Rob-
erts & Co., 8 Pa. Super. 500
(1898)
Sutton v. Risser, 104 Iowa
631, 74 N. W. 23 (1898)
Weill v. American Metal Co.,
182 Ill. 128, 54 N. E. 1050
(1899)
Littlejohn v. Shaw, 159 N. Y.
188, 53 N. E. 810 (1899)
Business Conditions at
Time of Breach.
Manner of Price Fluctua-
tion of Specific Commodity
Between Dates of Contract
and Breach.
Hurricane (1819)
Market gone if tender
not prompt.
Fair (1872)



















Bull. of Dept. Labor, Jan.-
Nov. 1900, Nos. 26-31, p,
282.
Fair
Op. cit. supra, at 252,
Fair
Op. cit. supra, at 300 and
303.
Fair
A small "d" after a case indicates a dictum.
Weill v. American Metal Co., supra, is still further bolstered by the fact that the buyer
demanded a lower price. It is interesting to trace throughout this section the growth of
the New York cases, to note how often a case which rules for the seller and In which
the breach occurred in fair times has followed a case in which the breach occurred In a
time of business stress, and how this gradually hardens into a line of ostensible precedent.
84. Keswick v. Rafter, 35 App. Div. 508, 513, 54 N. Y. Supp. 850, 854 (1898).
85. Meincke v. Falk, 61 Wis. 623, 21 N. W. 785 (1884).
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this period in which the breach occurred in "normal" times, the court
laid down a less rigid form of the rule, basing its holding on the theory
of the possibility of the obviation of the defect.8° The breach in the
case of Littlejohn v. Shaw itself occurred at a time of general business
stress. We can, accordingly, infer that in all but a very few of the cases
before Littlejohn v. Shaw probably one reason (and probably the most
important one) why the buyer was precluded from setting up his un-
stated objections was the fact that he was rejecting on a falling market
and that the court was unwilling to permit him to escape from the con-
tract in these circumstances.
8 7
In the cases between Littlejohn v. Shaw and Ginn v. Clark, we find a
difference of alignment under a falling market, depending on whether the
theory of the case is the same as that of these two cases or is some other
rule that is less rigid." In the cases that strictly follow the "waiver"
rule of the Littlejohn case, the ruling in most is accompanied by breach
in time of business stress or after drop in price of the specific commodity.
In one of them, Peterson Bros. v. Mineral King Fruit Co.,"' there was
evidence by the buyer that had the market not gone down he would
have accepted, and that on a rising market he could put goods through
which he could not on a falling market. In another, an Illinois case of
1904, the buyer had offered to take the goods at a lower price, to which
the seller had replied that he could not protect the buyer against a
glutted marketY0 It is unfortunate that in these cases, and in all cases
where the buyer states in his letter of rejection that he will not take the
goods because the price has gone down, because he is unable to pay, or
because of generally poor business conditions, the courts so seldom
stress that the other reasons which the buyer later seeks to set up are
probably unwarranted excuses to escape from a losing bargain, but lay
86. Smith v. Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13 (1877); Knox v. Schoenthal, 59 Hun 620, 13 N. Y.
Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1891). Estoppel is a "less rigid" form of the rule than waiver because,
while the theory of the latter is such that it is very likely to be treated as abzolute, the
theory of the former is such that it will often be invoked only after the court has made-
some examination of the factual set-up to see if there has been some sort of inducement
to reasonable action in reliance to damage. And we have seen that a large majority of
the cases that use the estoppel theory decide for the buyer. See note 27, supra. And sze
the text accompanying notes 21-29, supra.
87. See page 801, supra.
88. E.g., estoppel, stressing the commencement of litigation or the possibility of obviating
the defect. See note 86, supra. The emphasis here is not so much on variations in fact
situations as on what the court says. As to some of the more doubtful cases, there is room
for difference of opinion as to manner of assfication. But their number is slight. Some of
the cases used in this section are dicta, but their cumulative effect, especially when taken in
connection with a falling market, make them sufficiently important to be included.
89. 140 Cal. 624, 74 Pac. 162 (1903).
90. Olcese v. Mobile Fruit & Trading Co., 112 IM. App. 281 (1904).
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down an over-broad rule which has no relation to the facts-a rule which
can be applied even in the absence of a depressed market. The results
are usually sane on their facts. But by failing to relate certain material
facts more integrally to the rule of law, the court leaves open to future
courts a temptation to extend the rule beyond its sane limits.
In still another case in this period which followed the "waiver" theory,
the transactions and breach occurred at times when business conditions
were generally poor or were just beginning slightly to improve from a
previously depressed state. The constant bickerings as to price, related
in the report, also reveal some downward trend -in the market price for
the specific commodity."1 In the last case following apparently, though
not specifically, that theory, there is some external evidence of a drop
in the particular product. That this was the real reason for rejection is
further buttressed by the presence of constant price revision, and by the
willingness of the seller to agree to a lower price up to a certain point.0
The breach of Ginn v. Clark Coal Co. itself, however, occurred at a time
when the price of the specific commodity was rising and in a period of
"normal" business activity. 3 The decision in that case, forbidding the
setting up of unstated objections, exemplifies mechanical application of
the "waiver" rule to a situation where neither equitable nor economic
justification for it existed.
In the rest of the cases in this period the breach occurred in times that
may be termed "normal," and the movement of the specific prices
seemed to bear out on the whole the trend of the general market.0 4 But
91. Manda v. Etienne, 93 App. Div. 609, 611, 87 N. Y. Supp. 588, 593 (1st Dep't, 1904).
cited note 12, supra.
92. Drucklieb v. Universal Tobacco Co., 106 App. Div. 470, 94 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1st
Dep't, 1905).
93. 143 Mich. 84, 106 N. W. 867 (1906), see infra note 94.
94. Name of Case Business Conditions at Business Conditions at
Time of Breach. Time- of Decision.
Manner of Price Fluctua- Source of Information.
tion of Specific Commodity
Between Dates of Contract
and Breach.
Oakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Fair (1899-00) Fair
Wolf Co., 118 Fed. 239 (C. C. Steady (Sugar) Bull. Dept. Labor, Jan.-
A. 6th, 1902) Nov. 1900, Nos, 26-31, pp,
287-288. Jan.-Nov, 1902,
Nos. 38-43, p. 332.
Peterson Bros. v. Mineral
King Fruit Co., 140 Cal. 624, Squall
74 Pac. 162 (1903)
Rochevot v. Wolf, 96 App. Fair (1885-8) Fair




it is interesting to note that each of these cases stated some theory that
was not strictly that of Little john v. Shaw, proceeding instead on the
basis of some form of estoppel.°  This would seem to indicate that,
where the economic factor is absent, some more justifiable ground than
the empty formalism of the "waiver" rule is required in order to produce
a ruling against the buyer."' Thus additional strength is afforded the
belief that few if any, of these cases between Little john v. Shaw and
Ginn v. Clark Coal Co. should be accorded any weight as precedent for
the general proposition that unstated objections may never be set up
at trial even though the factual situation discloses neither price drop
nor any other factor which might give at least a semblanct of equitable
justification for a decision adverse to the buyer.°G
In those cases decided adversely to the buyer subsequent to Ginn v.
Clark Coal Co., one would expect to find a larger number of situations
not containing the element of price decline. One would expect that
the force of precedent would by now have become so great that the
factor of depression would be but rarely needed to motivate a ruling
against the buyer. It is then with some relish to be noted that despite
Littlejohn v. Shaw, and even with Ginn v. Clark Coal Co. on the
books, fully as large a proportion of the cases after the Ginn case
contain the economic factor as before. 7  This would seem to indicate
United Fruit Co. v. Bisese, Fair (1902) Fair
25 Pa. Super. 170 (1904) Steady (Fruit) U. S. Bur. Labor Statistics
Vol. 8, p. 256.
Manda v. Etienne, 93 App. Continued Stormy-Clearing Fair
Div. 609, 611, 87 N. Y. Supp. (1895-6) Case itself.
588, 593 (1st Dep't, 1904) Fall (flower bulbs)
Olcese v. Mobile Fruit & Storm (1893)
Trading Co., 112 Ill. App. 281 Fair
(1904)
Drucklieb v. Universal To- Fair (1901)
bacco Co., 106 App. Div. 470, Probably fall (tobacco) Fair
94 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1st Case itself and Bull. Dept.
Dep't, 1905) Labor, Jan.-Nov. 1902,
Nos. 38.43, pp. 454-455.
Ginn v. Clark, 143 Mich. 84,
106 N. W. 867 (1906) Fair (1902) Fair
95. Oakland Sugar Ill Co. v. Wolf Co, 118 Fed. 239 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902); Rochevot
v. Wolf, 96 App. Div. 506, 89 N. Y. Supp. 142 (4th Dep't, 1904); United Fruit Co. v.
Bisese, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 170 (1904).
96. Ginn v. Clark Coal Co. itself was decided with such blind subservience to prece-
dent [see the second opinion, 143 Mich. 88, 107 N. W. 94 (1906)] that it can hardly
be regarded as "authority."
97. In some of these cases there is evidence that the seller has resold at a price lower
than the contract price, but this of course indicates less than appears on the surface. The
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that the broad rule against setting up unstated defects has not suc-
ceeded in strengthening its position as precedent"0 where price decline
or one of the other justifying elements is not present.9
First let us look at the cases which have used the language of "waiver."
In four of these cases, not only was a price drop evident, but the courts
talked about it in language which indicated that this factor seemed to
them material. In Daniels v. Morris, it was said,
"Prior to October the price of hops had gone down ... so that at the time tile
hops were tendered . plaintiffs were anxious to be relieved from taking the [m]
... [Whether these were choice hops] depends upon the opinion of the person
judging, rather than on any accurately definable conditions. . . Opinions
differ... The lemand and price for the hops are subject to sudden and extreme
fluctuations without apparent reason; and, when a person makes such a con-
tract, he cannot expect the courts to show him leniency because of its hard-
ships when the price is adverse to him.'" 9
A Virginia court in 1925 said, "It seems plain from the evidence as a
whole that Fielding declined because of the fall in the market, but he
based his claim on the ground that his contract called for November
delivery, instead of November shipment. . .,,"oo In the same year an
Illinois court gave voice to the same sentiment;
"When the shipments arrived in July a tender was made to the defendant,
but refused, and diligent efforts by the plaintiff were insufficient to obtain a
statement of its reasons for such refusal. We are not, however, left in darkness:
the continually falling market price for this product illumines the situation.
And that the decline in price was the reason was established not only by oral
evidence but by mutual correspondence between the parties . . . "101
And a Nebraska case of 1912 even went so far as to declare that"
it was proper for the trial court to take into consideration judicial
knowledge that there was a general depression in business after the goods
were delivered to the carrier . . . and the fact that financial conditions,
arising unexpectedly after the goods were purchased, led to defendant's
attempt to countermand the orders."" 2
goods may have been damaged in some way; the seller may have been pressed for time,
because the goods were depreciating or for some other reason, and bad to get rid of them
to the first buyer who offered less than the prevailing price. An assumption has not
been felt warranted that merely because the seller resold at a price lower than the market
or contract price, that there had been a drop in the general market price for this product.
98. See notes 7, 24, 25, 27, supra.
99. 65 Ore. 289, 295, 130 Pac. 397, 399 (1913) (objection of overweight precluded, for
not only was there insufficient evidence of it, but objection not made at time of rejection).
100. See Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va. 123, 131, 126 S. E. 231, 233 (1925) (rejection
because customers refused to take, and defect remediable; held, no waiver because no
knowledge, but estoppel). We have included the case here instead of in the obviation
section because of its strength, and because such inclusion does not prejudice the analysis.
101. See National Importing & Trading Co. v. Bear & Co., 236 Iil. App, 426, 440
(1925) (a rejection stated generally held waived).
102. Rose, J. in Armsby Co. v. Raymond Bros.-Clarke Co., 90 Neb. 553, 561, 134 N.
W. 174, 177 (1912), cited note 5, supra.
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In Lowinson v. Newman, the court said, "The market price of the
goods covered by the contract had declined some two cents per yard.
Suppose that the market had risen, was there [anything in the rejection]
which would have relieved the plaintiff from completing his contract .... ?
Most assuredly not.' 0l13  The court here realized that had there been
a rising market something different would have happened. But it fails
to push that awareness to the point where it takes on rule-form, and can
be carried to its logical conclusion. A similar feeling is experienced in
the reading of a case like Harvard Co. v. Himnelein, °4 in which the
original rejection was based on the ground that customers refused
delivery.
There are other cases where the drop in the market is so pronounced
that the failure of the court to stress this in words as probably the real
reason for rejection is almost unforgivable. Among these are the sugar
cases of 1920, when the post-war price disintegration took almost un-
precedented toll on those who had contracted into the future. One case
among these mentions a drop from 2340 to 6%0 per pound, and never-
theless does not seem to realize what this means to the buyer's per-
formance.10 Another, though giving a slight indication that the court
knew of the drop in the market, nowhere specifically mentions the col-
lapse and fails utterly to indicate its effects."0 ' Then there are sev-
eral cases where the buyer states in the letter of rejection which he
sends to the seller that he will not take the goods because the price has
gone down, or because he is unable to pay, or because of generally poor
business conditions."0 7 In four remaining cases in which there is evi-
dence that the drop in the price of the specific product was known to
the court, there is nevertheless no stressing, either in the facts or in
the opinion, of the now patent fact that this may have been the real
reason for rejection-"'0 It is interesting to note that by far the greater
103. 201 App. Div. 266, 270, 194 N. Y. Supp. 253, 256-257 (1 st Dep't, 1922).
104. 226 Mich. 691, 198 N. W. 207 (1924), cited note 6, supra.
105. Colonial Ice Cream Co. v. Interocean Mercantile Corp., 296 Fed. 316, 319 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1924) (stressing the fact that the unstated defenses were not raised once before the
appeal, and that B was trying to avail himself of unsubstantial technical objections; the
verbal attitude being in favor of "the rule" of Littlejohn v. Shaw and, pardonably enoub
so cited in Erie Food Products Corp. v. Interocean Mercantile Corp., 299 Fed. 71 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1924).
106. Erie Food Products Co. v. Interocean Mercantile Corp., 299 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 6th,
1924) ("technical" insufficiency of tender precluded as a defense).
107. emnhard v. Gabrielsen Co., 224 Ky. 238, 5 S. W. (2d) 1070 (1928) (inability to
pay; other reasons were insufficient and also waived because of nonstatement) ; Eee Hi,-gLns
v. California Prune & Apricot Growers, 16 F. (2d) 190, 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (rejection
unless price revised); E. L. Rice & Co. v. Roberts, 172 S. E. 615, 616 (W. Va. 1934), cited
note 12, supra. Refer in this connection to pages S07-SOS, supra.
108. Rand v. Morse, 289 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. Sth, 1923) (if the jury found there was
knowledge of unstated defect they could find waiver on the principle that one settirg
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number of the breaches in all these cases, from our discussion of Daniels
v. Morris on, occurred in times of generally depressed business con-
ditions.109
up specific defenses cannot resort to others when sued); Chatham Ice Cream Co. v. Saka-
keeny, 29 Ga. App. 768, 116 S. E. 558 (1923) [Facts in 27 Ga. App. 409, 108 S. E. 802
(1921)3; Carson Petroleum Co. v. Balboa Trading Co., 120 Misc. 389, 198 N. Y. Supp. 556
(Sup. Ct. 1923); see Garcia & Maggini Co. v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., 294 Fed,
765, 768 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
109. Name of Case
Armsby Co. v. Raymond
Bros-Clarke Co., 90 Neb.
553, 134 N. W. 174 (1912)
Daniels v. Morris, 65 Ore.
289, 295, 130 Pac. 397, 399
(1913)
Chatham Ice Cream Co. v.
Sakakeeny, 29 Ga. App. 768,
116 S. E. 558 (1923)
Lowinson v. Newman, 201
App. Div. 266, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 253 (1st Dep't, 1922)
Rand v. Morse, 289 Fed. 339
(C. C. A. 8th, 1923)
Carson Petroleum Co. v. Bal-
boa Trading Co., 120 Misc.
389, 198 N. Y. Supp. 556
(Sup. Ct. 1923)
Harvard v. Himmelein, 226
Mich. 691, 198 N. W. 207
(1924)
Colonial Ice Cream Co. v.
Interocean Mercantile Corp.,
296 Fed. 316, 319 (C. C. A.
3d, 1924)
Erie Food Products Corp. v.
Interocean Mercantile Corp.,
299 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 6th,
1924)
Garcia & Maggini Co. v.
Washington Dehydrated Food
Co., 294 Fed. 765, 768 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1924)
Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va.
123, 126 S. E. 231 (1925).
National Importing & Trad-
ing Co v. Bear & Co., 236






























There remains a group of cases in which there is no evidence that
any price drop was known to the court.Y0 In one-third of these, as
Higgins v. California Prune &
Apricot Growers, 16 F. (2d)
190, 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
Merahard v. Gabrielsen Co.,
224 Ky. 238, 5 S. W. (2d)
1070 (1928)
E. L. Rice & Co. v. Roberts,
172 S. E. 615, 616 (W. Va.
1934)
110. Name of Case
Hess v. Kaufherr, 128 App.
Div. 526, 112 N. Y. Supp.
832 (1st Dep't, 1908)
Providence Jewelry Co. v.
Bailey, 159 Mich. 285, 123 N.
W. 1117 (1909)
Lorraine Mfg. Co. v. O-h-
insky, 182 Fed. 407 (C. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1910)
Honesdale Ice Co. v. Lake
Ladore Improvement Co.,
232 Pa. 293, 81 AtI. 306
(1911)
Cary Maple Sugar Co. v.
Pierre Viau Maple Co., 173
Ill. App. 93 (1912)
Howe Grain & Mercantile Co.
v. Taylor, 147 S. W. 656, 658
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912)
Mills v. Knickerbocker Hat
Co., 76 Misc. 446, 135 N. Y.
Supp. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1912)
Linger v. Vilson, 73 W. Va.
669, 80 S. E. 1108 (1914)
Foster Drug Co. v. Zeller &
Sons Co., 191 I11. App. SOS
(1915)
De Hoff v. Aspegren, 96 Misc.





Business Conditions at Time
of Breach.
Manner of Price Fluetua-
tion of Specific Commodity


















Steady and up (apples)
Fair
Fair
Bull. Dept. Labor, Vol. 20,







U. S. Bur. Labor Statistics,
Wh'sale Commodity Prices,
Bull. 1181, p. 39.
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appears from the footnote, irrespective of evidence as to what the court
knew, the factor of depression was present. The apparent problem
raised by the remaining two-thirds in which the breach occurred in
"normal" times fades into insignificance when it is seen that in the
entire group of "waiver" cases after Ginn v. Clark, about two-thirds
of the breaches still prove to have occurred in times of generally de-
pressed business conditions or when the price of the specific commodity
has fallen.
Similarly, in the group of cases that stresses, in its explicit theory, the
fact that the unstated defect was not made known until after litigation
had commenced, the economic factor of price decline is present in most
as a possibly contributing or even determining element. For example,
in a Federal District Court case of 1925 the court said,
Pierson & Co. v. American
Steel Export Co., 194 App.
Div. 555, 562, 185 N.Y. Supp.
527, 532 (1st Dep't, 1920)
Tuggle v. Green & Sons, 150
Ga. 361, 104 S. E. 85 (1920)
Robertson v. Garvan, 270
Fed. 643 (S. D. N. Y. 1920)
Baruch v. Dery, 188 N. Y.
Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1921)
Internat. Banking Corp. v.
Irving Nat. Bank, 274 Fed.
122 (S. D. N. Y. 1921)
Bank of America v. Whitney
Central Nat. Bank, 291 Fed.
929 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923)
Bank of Taiwan v. Union
Nat. Bank of Philadelphia, 1
F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 3d,
1924)
Hind v. Wihich, 127 Misc.
355, 216 N. Y. Supp. 155
(Sup. Ct. 1926)
Schulze Baking Co. v. Good-
son, 119 So. 353 (Miss. 1928)
Popper v. Rosen, 292 Pa. 122,

























Op. cit. supra. Bull, 269,
pp. 70-97
Stormy
Op. cit. supra. Bull, 269,
p. 86. Bull. 296, p. 132.
Fair
Second National Bank of
Allegheny v. Lash Corp.,
299 Fed. 371 (C. C. A. 3d,
1924)
Fair
Young v. Rocha, 65 Cal.





U. S. Bureau Labor Statis-
tics, Wh'sale Prices, BulI,
390, 415, 440, 458, p. 171.
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"It is, of course, a fact that toward the end of that year [19201 there was the
greatest fall in the price of staples in the history of civilization. And on the
whole I cannot avoid the conclusion that this contract, on the part of the
defendant, was a mere 'leap in the dark.... It arrived upon a glutted and falling
market, and it was contracted for at a time when American buyers were
feverishly contending with one another for any kind of sugar... The delay
in shipping the second cargo had nothing whatever to do with the rejection.
On the contrary, the evidence fairly justifies the conclusion that the defendant
contracted for an article not readily saleable in this market, and that the
rejection was due to the discovery of this fact, coupled with a falling market."n
This language was quoted with approval on appeal."- In another
case the buyer stated in his letter of rejection that the price was too
high and that he would take only at a lower price."13 In the remaining
cases in this section, those in which there is no explicit evidence that the
court knew of the price drop or of a generally depressed market at the
time of breach, these factors were in fact present in about half." 4
111. Partridge, J. in Mathieu v. Geo. A. Moore & Co., 4 F. (2d) 251, 253, 255 (N. D.
Cal 1925).
112. Geo. A. Moore & Co. v. Mathieu, 13 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
113. Cobb Lumber Co. v. Sunny South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E. 759 (1926).
114. Name of Case Business Conditions at Business Conditions at Time
Time of Breach. of Decision.
Manner of Price Fluctua- Source of Information.
tion of Specific Commodity
Between Dates of Contract
and Breach.
Bedingfield & Co. v. Bates Fair (1904) Cyclone
Advertising Co., 2 Ga. App.
107, 58 S. E. 320 (1907)
Poison Logging Co. v. Neu-
meyer, 229 Fed. 705 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1916)
Fruit Dispatch Co. v. Petro-
pol, 25 Ga. App. 839, 105 S
E. 48, 49 (1920)
Cadick Milling v. Voldosta
Grocery Co., 72 Ind. App.
534, 126 N. E. 240 (1920)
Wall Grocer Co. v. Jobbers'
Overall Co., 264 Fed. 71 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1920)
Godchaux Sugars Inc. v. Mer-
idian Wholesale Co., 289 Fed.
359 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923)
Frank & Meyer Neckwear Co.
v. White, 29 Ga. App. 694,











U. S. Bureau Labor Statis-





Case itself and op. cit.
supra. Bull. 269, p. 74
Fair
Second National Bank of
Allegheny v. Lash Corp,





In the cases that place their theory on some other form of estoppel,
such as the possibility of obviating the defects had timely notice been
given, the economic factor is likewise usually present. In Griin
Grocery Co. v. Richardson it was said, "The proof showed that there
was a marked decline in the price of seed between the time the contracts
were made and the cars were received, and that the defendant accepted
two cars of seed. Under such circumstances, the fact that the seed in
all the cars was of the same quality would have a material bearing on
whether or not the defendant rejected the seed on the ground of
quality."" 5 Another case mentions the drop in the market (and note
that it 'was a 1920 sugar case) and that thereafter the buyer tried to
cancel its contract, the court practically saying that it was because of
the drop in the market that he cancelled, but nowhere making that
belief explicit or in any wise stressing it.110 In the rest of the cases in
this group, with only one exception, there is no evidence that the court
knew of the market drop, but the breach in the majority occurred in
fact on a depressed market. 1 The single exception is a case in which
115. Phillips, J. in 10 F. (2d) 467, 471 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (defect remediable).
116. Second Nat. Bank of Allegheny v. Lash Corp., 299 Fed. 371 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924),
cited note 21, supra.
117. Name of Case Business Conditions at
Miller v. Ungerer, 188 App.
Div. 655, 176 N. Y. Supp. 850
(2d Dep't, 1919)
Smith v. Moscahlades, 193
App. Div. 126, 134, 184 N.
Y. Supp. 500, 507 (1st Dep't,
1920)
Hyman v. Hllman, 205 App.
Div. 119, 124, 199 N. Y. Supp.
366, 369 (1st Dep't, 1923)
Time of Breach.
Manner of Price Fluctua-
tion of Specific Commodity










U. S. Bureau Labor Stat.
Wh'sale Commod. Pr. Bull.
266, p. 80.
Savannah Chemical Co. v. W. Partly Cloudy-Stormy Fair
R. Grace & Co., 293 Fed. 145 (1920-1) U. S. Bur. Labor Stat. Bull,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1923) Decline (nitrate of soda) 320, p. 216.
O'Meara v. National Park Partly Cloudy-Stormy Fair
Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. (1920-1)
E. 636 (1925)
There are two cases, Hill v. Fruita Mercantile Co., 42 Colo. 491, 94 Pac. 354 (190q)
and Trevas & Schack, Inc. v. Napel Mills Co., 241 Mass. 452, 135 N. E. 477 (1922), that
could not be forced into any of the classes without doing too great violence to the cases.
They do not, however, disturb the above conclusions. Their analysis is:
Hill v. Fruita Mercantile Co. Squall (1903) Clearing




price disputes indicate that there was a dropping market as to the spe-
cific commodity.11
A canvassing of the foregoing data will reveal that of the entire list
of cases decided in favor of the seller after Ginn v. Clark, the factor of
depression is present in two-thirds. 19 It thus appears that there is in
fact no genuine precedent-tradition growing out of the Littlejohn and
Ginn cases.
Another check on the data presented will show that in the full sweep
from before Littlejohn v. Shaw up to the present, two-thirds of all the
cases reveal a generally depressed market or a price drop in the specific
commodity. 20 Considering this, it is believed justifiable to say that
this line of decisions, taken as a whole, may not be reasonably regarded
as precedent for the proposition that unstated defenses may not be
relied upon at trial even when neither price drop nor any other element
is present which might justify their preclusion. In dealing with Sales
cases of this type, therefore, the courts should pay no heed to seeming
precedent barring unstated defects, unless an examination of the fact
situation in each particular case reveals either that the seller actually
and reasonably suffered material damage as a result of the buyer's
failure to include all his defenses in his first statement of defect, or else
that the buyer is actually endeavoring to escape from a contract which
adverse market conditions has rendered burdensome to him.
RPECOM ENDATIONS
After tracing the vagaries of the rule precluding unstated defects
from being set up as defenses, a statute designed to incorporate into the
law what business men would concede was a fair treatment of their
dealings can now be proposed. Such a statute should put the burden on
the seller of demanding a formal statement of defects. But such state-
ment by the buyer should neither bar defects of which the buyer could
not have knowledge, nor should it bar use of unstated defects about
which the seller ought reasonably to have known. As to all other de-
fects, whether remediable or not, the formal statement, once requested,
should act as a conclusive bar. Only so can compromise-adjustment
be encouraged. If the buyer, acting as a normal business man unaware
of his legal rights, sends a notice before demand by the seller for a par-
ticularized statement, such notice should not act as a bar unless it has
118. Hyman v. Hullman, 205 App. Div. 119, 199 N. Y. Supp. 366 (1st Dep't, 1923), cited
note 8, supra (rejection because price too high and no opportunity to examine).
119. The numerical count comes to 32 cases containing the factor of depression, as
against 15 not containing that factor.
120. A numerical count simila to note 119, supra comes to 44 cases with the depresion
factor present as against 21 without that factor.
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misled the seller into doing or refraining from doing some available act
to protect his interest. Such a reliance on the statement by the seller
must occur in fact (there must be no presumption that the necessary
effect of the statement is to mislead); the seller's reliance must be reas-
onable, tested by the standards of the ordinary business man; and he
must have suffered some damage thereby. Also, such statement should
act as a bar if the circumstances in which it is sent, together with the
reasons assigned, indicate that the defects left unstated were not really
material to the buyer. Finally, the buyer must not be protected if he
says or does nothing after receipt of the seller's demand. He must be
placed under a duty to reply; and failure to perform that duty within
a reasonable time should result in a barring of all defects which have not
been communicated to the seller prior to the receipt of the demand.
Such a statute, which could be considered an addition to Section 49
of the Uniform Sales Act, would read:
Section 49.
(2) (a) The buyer is barred from setting up unstated defects in
any subsequent litigation, when he gives notice of objections before de-
mand therefor, only if his notice actually, reasonably, and materially
misleads the seller or if his statement, together with the surrounding
circumstances, indicates that the unstated defects were not really ma-
terial to his rejection. The burden of proving actual, reasonable, and
material reliance and immateriality of the unstated defect is on the
seller.
(b) The seller is entitled, on demand therefor, to a formal
statement of all objections readily ascertainable by the buyer at the time
of such demand. Such statement will bar the setting up in any subse-
quent litigation of any defect unmentioned whose existence was not
already reasonably ascertainable by the seller. Failure to reply to the
seller's demand with a formal statement of objections within a reason-
able time will bar the setting up in any subsequent litigation of all ob-
jections not specified prior to the receipt of such demand.
[Vol. 44
